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INTRODUCTION

More competition! That slogan was the battle cry of those in
favor of legislation to deregulate the telecommunications industry.
On February 8, 1996,' they got their wish-or did they? On that day
President Clinton signed the Act designed to revolutionize the telecommunications industry. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
("1996 Act") outlined the new playing field for telecommunications
services and promised "[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers."2 Various commentators
spoke grandiosely of the forthcoming consumer savings and improvements in telecommunications services.3 To date, however, the 1996
1 On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
(Supp. I 1996)). See Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 188 (Feb. 8, 1996) (WilliamJ. Clinton).
2 110 Stat. at 56.
S
See, e.g., Editorial, Congress Maps a Telecom Future, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 6, 1996, at A14
("[The] overall thrust [of the 1996 Act] is dearly deregulatory and pro-competitive ...
[and] eventually, nearly every American should experience the benefits of increased competition: lower prices, more choice and new technologies."); Bryan Gruley & Albert R.
Karr, Telecom Vote Signals Competitive Free-for-AL" Bill's PassageRepresents Will of Both Parties,
WALL ST.J., Feb. 2, 1996, at B1 (claiming that "after a year or so, [i] t's going to be great for

consumers because they're going to get more competition, lower prices, more choice and
better technology" (internal quotation marks omittd)); see also THoMAsJ. DUESrERBERG &
KENNETH

GORDON,

COMPETITION AND DEREGULATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

2 (1997)

("The Telecommunications Act was more than two decades in the making, but its proponents ... had high hopes that a rapid harvest of benefits would follow upon its passage.").

1420

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1418

Act has proved to be a boon only for lawyers and regulators, while
consumers have felt few benefits. 4 The primary players in the industry-the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) 5 and the major long-distance service providers6-have fought bitterly and incessantly over
every detail of the 1996 Act. 7 In the meantime, the Federal Communi-

cations Commission (FCC or "the Commission"), charged with implementing the 1996 Act's procompetition prescriptions, thus far has
failed to speed up the deregulation process. As a result, consumers
continue to wait for the promised benefits, which hopefully will arrive
once the 1996 Act begins to affect the marketplace in earnest.
In the core provisions of the 1996 Act, Congress sought to change
the regulatory landscape by introducing competition to the local telephone markets, which the BOCs currently monopolize. 8 In return for
stripping the BOCs of their local-service monopoly, the 1996 Act permits them to compete in the long-distance service market-an area
from which the prior regulatory scheme had banned them.9 By removing the legal barriers to entry and allowing players in each industry segment to invade the other's turf, Congress designed the 1996 Act
to spark intense competition in both the local and long-distance markets. Industry analysts estimate that the local telephone market generates revenues of $110 billion and that the long-distance market

4 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Editorial, The FCC vs. the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Sept.
9, 1997, at A18 ("[Tlhe law isn't working as intended, and the American consumers are
still waiting for free and healthy competition in communications services.").
5 BOGs are a creature of the 1983 AT&T divestiture. Prior to the 1996 Act, there
were seven regional BOGs (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis,
SBC Communications, and US West). The BOCs currently provide approximately 99% of
all local telephone service in the United States. See Michael F. Finn, The PublicInterest and
Bell Entry into Long-Distance Under Section 271 of the Communications Act, 5 CoMMLw CoNsPEcrus 203, 218 (1997). See infra Part I.A.2 for a detailed discussion of the creation and
regulation of the BOGs.
6
Long-distance service providers also are known as interexchange carriers (IXCs).
There are three major carriers-AT&T, MCIWorldcom, and Sprint. The term "interexchange carrier" derives from the nature of how long-distance service providers operate.
They must take a phone call originating from one local exchange network, switch it to
their long-distance network, and then switch it back to the appropriate local exchange
network where the call terminates. They, thus, "exchange" the phone call between two
local networks.
7
Former FCC Commissioner Reed Hundt testified before Congress: "What we have
• . . are thousands of devices of tortuous delay and tortured questioning at every phrase,
word and punctuation mark of the Telecom Act." The 1996 Telecom Act: An Antitrust Perspective: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust,Bus. Rights, and Competition of the Senate Comm.
on theJudiciary, 105th Cong. 21 (1997) (statement of Reed E. Hundt) [hereinafter Hundt
Subcomm. Statement].
8
Prior to the 1996 Act, the law did not allow BOCs to provide certain long-distance
telephone services, while long-distance carriers could not provide local telephone services.
See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
9 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252, 271-272 (Supp. II 1996).
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generates equally staggering revenues of $80 billion.' 0 With such
huge sums at stake, many commentators and industry experts anticipated the barrage of legal jockeying that followed the passing of the
landmark legislation." Unfortunately, the FCC has contributed to
the delays and the legal uncertainty surrounding the impending deregulation.' 2 Congress charged the FCC with moving the deregulatory process along quickly,' 3 and while the Commission already may
have failed to fulfill this mandate, it must alter its current strategies if
it hopes to eventually achieve the anticipated deregulation. The FCC
needs to shrink into the background. As the FCC loosens its grip on
the key players, the market forces that Congress envisioned when
drafting the 1996 Act will be able to take hold more quickly.
Section 271 of the 1996 Act requires the BOCs to apply to the
FCC for permission to enter the long-distance market. 14 Until the
FCC grants them permission, the BOCs may not provide long-distance
service. This Note focuses on the § 271 application process. It argues
that the FCC must minimize its regulatory role under the 1996 Act to
best promote competition in the telecommunications markets. 15 To
achieve this goal, this Note proposes that the FCC lower the standards
it has set for BOG entry into the long-distance market' 6 The FCC
itself recently acknowledged that its original § 271 regulations need
10 See Aaron Pressman, After Two Years, Telecom Act's Promise Unfulfilled, RE:uxs, Feb.
8, 1998.
11
See, e.g., Gruley & Karr, supra note 3 ("Businesses already are gearing up to deluge
the agency with lawyers and lobbyists. Many of the FCC's decisions are certain to be challenged in court.").
12 See DuESRBERG & GoRDoN, supra note 3, at 75 ("One can..'. make [a] case that
several important FCC actions to date have impeded both the rapid deregulation sought by
the authors of the act and the general process of introducing broad, facilities-based competition to the industry.").
13 Congress made the opening of local markets to competition the first step towards
deregulation. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (requiring BOCs to obtain Commission approval
prior to providing long-distance service). Congress also directed the FCC to "complete all
actions necessary to establish regulations" detailing that the FCC would open local markets
for competition within six months after the enactment of the 1996 Act. Id. § 251(d) (1).
14 See id. § 271(d).
15 The FCC has numerous obligations under the 1996 Act. Other FCC actions and
promulgations largely are, however, beyond the scope of this Note. There is an argument
that the FCC has been regulating too extensively since the passage of the 1996 Act through
its many administrative orders. See generallyDUESTERBERG & GORDON, supranote 3, at 73-79

(complaining that the FCC has micromanaged the entire deregulatory process). This
Note, however, specifically highlights § 271 applications as both a specific example of how
the FCC has taken an overly detailed approach to the deregulatory process and an example
of how the FCC can use its statutory authority to promote competition more quickly.
16 Interestingly, a district court in Northern Texas held that § 271, as well as other
provisions of the 1996 Act, represents an unconstitutional bill of attainder. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1008 (N.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
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revamping. 17 The FCC's proposed strategy does not go far enough,
however. Adequate safeguards already exist to ensure competition
will prosper when the BOCs enter the long-distance market. The
FCC, therefore, should adopt a minimalist approach. Such an approach will lead more quickly to an approved § 271 application and to
the concomitant consumer benefits, bringing the lofty aims of the
1996 Act closer to fruition.
Part I of this Note briefly looks at the history of both the telecommunications industry and its regulation. An historical perspective of
the industry's evolution allows for a fuller appreciation of the contentiousness that has developed among the various parties. Part I also
sheds light on the concerns that have guided the FCC's actions since
the passage of the 1996 Act. Part II focuses on the § 271 applications
that BOCs filed with the FCC during the first two years after passage of
the 1996 Act. BOCs filed four applications during this time, and the
FCC rejected each of them.' 8 This Part analyzes the FCC's grounds
for rejecting each application, demonstrating that the FCC has chosen
to take an overly skeptical and detailed approach to the § 271 process.
Part III argues that the FCC need not maintain such a stringent attitude towards the BOCs' applications. This Part suggests that the FCC
safely could take a more minimalist approach. It outlines several reasons why there should be little concern that BOC entry into the longdistance market would cause the telecommunications industry once
again to succumb to monopolization. The statutory regime Congress
has established, coupled with the technological and economic
changes in the industry, adequately can prevent a monopoly from
forming. The potential benefits of lowering the § 271 standards are
the subject of Part IV. Under a minimalist approach, the FCC more
quickly could grant BOCs permission to provide long-distance service.
This Part also discusses the potential benefits BOC entry into the longdistance market will foster. The overarching purpose of the 1996 Act
was, and still is, to unleash competition throughout the telecommuni17 In January 1998, the FCC issued a press release acknowledging that it should revamp the § 271 process. See Wake-up Call: FCC CommissionerMichael Powell Calls for New
"CollaborativeApproach" to Section 271 Applications, Jan. 15, 1998, available in 1998 FCC
LEXIS 191, *1 [hereinafter CollaborativeApproach]. This approach calls for the FCC, BOCs,
and other interested parties to work together prior to a BOC's filing of a § 271 application.
See id. at *7-*13. For further discussion concerning this proposal, see infra note 273 and
accompanying text.
18 A fifth application was filed inJuly 1998. OnJuly 9, 1998, BellSouth filed its second
application to provide service in Louisiana. See Brief in Support of Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Long Distance,
Inc. for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana, BellSouth Corp., 13

F.C.C.1L 20,599 (1998) (No. 98-121) (on fie with FCC). The FCC rejected this application. See BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599 (1998) (Second BellSouth Louisiana Order).
This application and accompanying order are not part of this Note's in-depth analysis infra

Part II.
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cations industry. By regulating less, the FCC would go a long way toward achieving this goal.
I
TBE EVOLUTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES

A.

The Telecommunications Industry and Its Regulation Prior to
the 1996 Act

The 1996 Act itself, its terms, its concerns, and its goals all stem
largely from the various regulatory frameworks imposed on the telecommunications industry as it evolved. This evolution shows that the
key players consistently have demonstrated monopolistic tendencies.
These tendencies have plagued regulators and ultimately spawned the
lawsuit that culminated with the divestiture of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T).
1.

Origins of the Telecommunications Industry and the FCC

Perhaps not surprisingly, "[g]overnment has involved itself in
telecommunications in the United States since the beginning of telegraphy"; 19 moreover, throughout the history of telecommunications,
the industry participants always have attempted to build monopoly
power.20 In 1876 Alexander Graham Bell received a patent-granting
him a statutory monopoly-for his "new and useful Improvements in
Telegraphy," 21 and thus began the storied association between "telephone" and "monopoly."
In the years immediately following the expiration of Bell's original patents, 1893 and 1894, sufficient competition existed such that
few worried about a monopoly forming.2 2 Indeed, in 1907 non-Belloperated companies owned forty-nine percent of the telephone stations in the United States. 2 3 This relatively competitive state of affairs
19

MORTON I. HAMBURG

& STUART N. BROTMAN, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 1.04[l], at 1-19 (1998).
20 See JAmEs M. HERRING & GERALD C. GROSS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND
REGULATION 3 (1936) (pointing out that by 1880, one entity, Western Union, carried 92%
of all telegraph messages and accounted for 89% of the industry's revenue).
21 The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 6 (1888) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 1.04[2], at 1-20 to 1-21 (providing a brief history of the telephone's invention).
22 SeeJim Chen, The Legal Process and PoliticalEconomy of Telecommunications Reform, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 835, 837-38 (1997) ("Contrary to the conventional view of telephony as the
quintessential natural monopoly, the rise of the Bell octopus was neither natural nor inevitable. Indeed, one century ago, an informed observer might have expected competition to
discipline the telephone industry. .. ."); see also HAmBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19,
§ 1.04[3] [a]-[b], at 1-22 to 1-23 (describing AT&T's patent monopoly from 1876 to 1893
and the rise of industry competition between 1893 and 1913).
23 See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 1.04[3] [b], at 1-23.

1424

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1418

did not persist for long, however. When the Bell system formed AT&T
as its parent company in 1899, it commenced an aggressive and relentless program aimed at buying local, independent phone companies
throughout the country. 24 In so doing, AT&T gained control of a sig-

nificant number of the local exchange carriers (LECs).25 Because of
the substantial capital investment required to construct a local exchange network, most telephone markets had only a single LEC.2 6 As

a result, any telephone service carrier wanting to complete calls for its
customers that lived in an area with an AT&T-controlled LEC had to
negotiate an "interconnection" agreement with AT&T. AT&T often
would refuse to provide the necessary interconnection, or it would
charge exorbitant interconnection rates to push the prospective competitor out of business. 27 Either way, AT&T thwarted any potential
competition through its growing network of local companies that
28
formed its nascent monopoly.
In the early 1900s Congress made a halfhearted attempt at regulating AT&T's growing monopoly by defining telephone companies as
"common carriers," thereby subjecting AT&T to Interstate Commerce
Commission regulation. 29 This move required AT&T to provide,
upon request, interconnection service at reasonable rates and without
unjust discrimination or preference.3 0 Congress failed, however, to
id.

24
25
26

See

30

See id.

See Chen, supra note 22, at 838.
Cf., e.g.,
HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 1.04[3] [c], at 1-24 to 1-25 (describing regulators' efforts to improve telephone efficiency and quality, a policy which, combined with high capital costs, led to market consolidation).
27
See Chen, supra note 22, at 839 (noting that interexchange carriers, like AT&T,
could "refuse interconnection to nonaffiliated LECs" and that AT&T "favor[ed] its affiliates and.., squeeze [d] out rival LECs until they folded or sold out at a distressed price").
28
See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 1.0413] [b], at 1-23. Pundits used to
refer to the provision of local services as a "natural monopoly." A natural monopoly can be
simply defined as "the situation in which one firm can serve a market more cheaply than
two or more firms can." WILLUAM A. McEAcHERN, ECONOMICS 87 (1988) (typeface altered).
In more elaborate economic terms:
In a competitive market structure, microeconomic theory says that producers will price at or near marginal costs because they will expand output
until their average costs equal marginal costs. In some situations, however,
the most efficient producer faces declining marginal costs throughout the
full range of expected demand.... Less efficient producers are put out of
business by the most efficient producer because there is no point on their
cost curves that is as low as the price for which the most efficient producer
can sell.
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 302 (1996) (footnote
omitted). Most now agree that the local exchange service is no longer a natural monopoly.
See, e.g., DUEERBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 73-74 (refuting the natural monopoly
notion). The evolution away from a natural monopoly was the product of "[t]he vast addition of new transmission capacity through fiber-optic cable, wireless technologies, and new,
more efficient cable-telephone technologies." Id. at 34.
29
Chen, supra note 22, at 838-39.
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"extend tariff filing obligations to telecommunications carriers
[thereby, i]n the most meaningful respects, [leaving] 'AT&T... free
to determine its rates, its return on investment, and its service obligaCourts followed the congressional lead and also failed to
tion.''
check AT&T's growth. In particular, both state and federal courts permitted AT&T to refuse interconnection to rival local service providers,3 2 leaving AT&T ample leeway to pursue its monopolistic
ambitions.
With AT&T's dominance of the telecommunications industry
firmly established,3 3 Congress passed the Communications Act of
1934.34 Under this Act, Congress created the Federal Communica-

tions Commission to represent Congress's national policy interests in
developing and regulating the telecommunications field.3 5 The Act
gave the FCC jurisdiction over all interstate communications and at
the same time confirmed the state public utilities commissions'
(PUCs) control over intrastate communications. 36 A tug-of-war between local PUCs and the FCC defined the regulatory climate during
the next several decades. Each agency sought to dominate the regulatory scene, but neither attempted to make any significant dents in
37
AT&T's continuously growing monopoly.
The emergence of Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI) in the
1960s heralded the next phase of regulation. During this phase, the

31 Id. at 839 (quoting Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114,
1119 (3d Cir. 1979)).
32 See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699, 703 (E.D. Wash. 1912)
("[E]ach telephone company is independent of all other telephone companies... and

hence.., it is not bound to accord to any such outside organization or its patrons connections with its switchboard on an equality with its own patrons .... ."); Home Tel. Co. v.
People's Tel. & Tel. Co., 141 S.W. 845, 848 (Tenn. 1911) ("But [the requirement of impartiality] does not mean that a telephone company is bound to permit another telephone
company to make a physical connection with its lines for the purpose of using them as its
own subscribers use them."); see also Chen, supra note 22, at 839 & n.26 (citing Pacific
Telephone and Home Teephone as evidence ofjudicial leniency towards AT&T's monopolistic
practices).
3
See HAMBURG & BRoTMAN, supra note 19, § 1.0414], at 1-26 ("By 1934 ... AT&T and
its affiliated operating companies generated 94.3% of all local exchange messages.").
34 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
35
See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. I11996) ("[F]or the purpose of securing a more effective
execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted... to several agencies
...there is created a commission to be known as the 'Federal Communications Commission' .....) .

See id. § 253.
See generally Chen, supra note 22, at 840-45 (describing how AT&T's monopoly remained relatively untouched while the PUCs and the FCC took turns being the dominant
regulatory authority).
36

37
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FCC opened the long-distance market to limited competition.3 8 Initially the FCC sought to restrain MCI's growth, clinging to the theory
that the long-distance market could not be competitive and that the
FCC should continue to regulate it as a public utility.3 9 MCI, however,
successfully challenged several of the FCC's policies and rulings. The
D.C. Circuit twice ruled in MCI's favor, 4° setting the stage for full-scale
competition in the long-distance market. In MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit forced Bell LECs to interconnect longdistance services provided by non-Bell-affiliated companies. 4 1 At this
point, "[a] chastened Commission... conceded that [long-distance]
service could be provided on a competitive basis and began ordering
42
interconnection as a matter of course."
2.

The Divestiture of AT&T

With the entry of MCI and other long-distance service providers,
the long-distance industry began to show signs of competitiveness. 43
AT&T, however, still controlled seventy-five to eighty-five percent of
the long-distance market in the early 1980s. 44 Although the courts
required AT&T to provide interconnection to competing long-distance carriers, AT&T's monopoly persisted. Two economic phenomena largely accounted for AT&T's ability to maintain its monopoly:
cross-subsidization and self-preference.
Cross-subsidization (sometimes referred to as cost misallocation),
for this Note's purposes, occurs when one entity enjoys monopoly
power in a regulated industry while simultaneously competing in a
nonregulated industry. 45 AT&T was so thoroughly integrated that it
38 See Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 967 (1969) (permitting MCI
to provide long-distance service and compete with AT&T via microwave frequencies in certain markets).
39
See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 1.04[5], at 1-26 to 1-27 (reviewing the
FCC's policy conclusions that the long-distance market required "continued surveillance"
and should be regulated as a public utility).
40 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (directing the FCC
and AT&T to comply with the earlier court mandate that AT&T provide interconnections
for MCI's Execunet service); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(reversing the FCC's cease-and-desist orders advising MCI to stop offering and operating its
Execunet service).
41 See MCI, 580 F.2d at 591.
42 Chen, supra note 22, at 846 (footnote omitted).
43 See id. at 850.
44 Compare Eli M. Noam, Federaland State Roles in Telecommunications: The Effects ofDeregulation,36 VAND. L. REv. 949, 967 (1983) (noting one study that pegged AT&T's market
share in 1979 at 84.9%), with United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 171 (D.D.C. 1982)
(highlighting AT&T's concession that its market share totaled 77% in 1981).
45

See generallyDANIEL L. BRENNER, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMON CARRIERS IN THE

COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 171-73 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining the fundamental tenets of
cross-subsidization).
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could take advantage of several cross-subsidies. 46 AT&T's ability to
shift costs between its local and long-distance service-providing subsidiaries deeply concerned regulators. 47 Because the PUCs exercised jurisdiction over AT&T's local-calling rates, while the FCC regulated
AT&T's long-distance rates, AT&T had to separate joint costs before
setting its rates. 48 Joint costs are those costs that are not directly allocable to the provision of either local or long-distance service. Therefore, to measure accurately how much it costs a company to provide
long-distance service versus local service, a company must measure the
joint costs and attribute them to each type of service. This allocation
necessarily requires a certain degree of estimation. AT&T could,
therefore, effectively allocate-or misallocate-a large portion of its
joint costs to the regulated local exchange market. 4 9 At the time,
PUCs calculated AT&T's allowable local rates based substantially on
the company's reported costs; therefore, an increase in costs did not
necessarily diminish AT&T's profits.5 0 As AT&T's reported costs increased, PUCs would allow it to charge higher prices to consumers to
offset its supposedly declining rate of return. 51 Moreover, because
AT&T shifted costs away from its long-distance service, it could cut
prices in that market without affecting its overall net profits. 52 The
cross-subsidization was complete: AT&T could undercut any potential
competitor in the long-distance market. And due to the highly technological and complicated nature of the industry, AT&T effectively
could accomplish this cross-subsidization "in ways extremely hard for
53
regulators to detect."
AT&T also resisted competition through self-preference. As described above, long-distance carriers can operate only through interconnection with local networks. 5 4 Although the MCI court required
46 See THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PoucY 349-52 (2d
ed. 1998).
47 Other forms of cross-subsidies include cost shifting from business to residential
customers, from urban to rural customers, and from heavily to lightly used routes. See id. at
349-50.
48
See id. at 349.
49
See BRENNER, supra note 45, at 171-72.
50 Cf. Finn, supra note 5, at 228 ("'[I]f a regulated monopolist... reports as bottleneck costs what are really long-distance costs, it may be able to defraud ratepayers who are
committed to covering the costs of the bottleneck.'" (quotingJoseph Farrell, CreatingLocal
Competition, 49 FED. Cosmm. L.J. 203, 207 (1996))).
51
See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 4.04[1] [e], at 4-37 to 4-40.
52
See Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing The AT&T Settlement
and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6, 8 (1983) (demonstrating that
AT&T's average rate charged for a long-distance call decreased in 1975 and 1977).
53
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Elusive Goals Under the TelecommunicationsAct: PreservingLong
Distance Competition upon Baby Bell Entry and AttainingLocal Exchange Competition: We'll Not
Preserve the One Unless We Attain the Other, 25 Sw. U. L. Rxv. 487, 518 (1996).
54 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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AT&T to provide this access on a nondiscriminatory basis,55 it quickly
became apparent that AT&T could circumvent the court's mandate by
delaying the process or even by refusing to provide to any competing
carriers the required interconnection. 56 As with cross-subsidies, regu57
lators often had an extremely difficult time policing these tactics.
The system AT&T had built up and ferociously defended dominated
both the local and long-distance markets.
AT&T's anticompetitive tactics and their deleterious effects on
consumers obviously did not escape the government's notice. In 1974
the Justice Department renewed its antitrust suit against AT&T. 58
This lawsuit eventually would result in the divestiture of the telecommunications Goliath. 59 In 1982 AT&T agreed to settle the case and
divest its local operating companies. 60 The result was the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ),61 which one commentator referred to
as the "crowning achievement of American telecommunications law's
62
first century."
The MJ's provisions sought to ensure that an unregulated telecommunications monopoly never would exist again. The MFJ turned
AT&T into primarily a long-distance service provider, stripping the
company of its local exchange interests and allocating those interests
among the newly established regional BOCs.

63

Each BOC operated in

its own geographically designated area, which the MFJ further divided
into Local Access Transport Areas (LATAs).64 The MFJ imposed specific line-of-business restrictions that, most importantly, explicitly
barred the BOCs from providing service for calls that occurred between LATAs ("interLATA" calls). This limitation restricted the BOCs
to providing service only for calls originating and terminating within
the same LATA ("intraLATA" calls).65 These line-of-business restric55
See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (defining the
breadth of AT&T's obligations).
56
See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 4.05[1] [a], at 4-49; PAUL W. MAcAVoY,
THE FAILURE OF ANTrrRUST AND REGULATION To ESTABUSH COMPETrIION IN LONG-DISTANCE
TELEPHONE SERVICES 14 (1996).
57 See Sullivan, supra note 53, at 527 ("The lack of capacity of regulators to deal with
[cross-subsidy and self-preference] tactics is emblematic of the pre-MFJ period. The FCC's
failure to inhibit such practices through regulatory means was documented at the trial of
DOJ's case against AT&T.").
58
See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 4.05 [1] [a], at 4-49.
59 See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
60 For a succinct account of the procedural skirmishing that led to the decision to
settle and the subsequent negotiations involving AT&T, the Department of Justice, and
Judge Harold Greene, see HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 4.05[(1], at 4-48 to 4-54.
61
See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 140-43.
62 Chen, supra note 22, at 852.
63 See id.
64 See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 4.05 [2] [a], at 4-54.
65 See jd
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tions constituted the heart of the MFJ and dramatically changed the
structure of the telecommunications industry by forcing the BOCs out
of the long-distance market. Congress "conditionally eliminated [all
66
of these] restrictions" when it passed the 1996 Act.

B.

The Events Leading to Congress's Passing of the 1996 Act

The MIFJ lasted twelve years and at least according to one commentator "accomplished precisely what [earlier regulatory efforts]
had failed to do-impose structural changes in the Bell System that
impaired AT&T's ability to stifle competition." 67 During the MFJ era,
the FCC continued its deregulatory efforts, and one of its most substantial achievements during this time was replacing rate-of-return
regulation with price-cap regulation. 68 Under price-cap regulation,
the FCC sets a limit on the ultimate price, rather than the profit, that
the regulated entity can charge. 69 Price-cap regulation changes the
regulated entity's behavioral calculus, providing it an incentive to minimize its costs. 7 0 Some state commissions followed the FCC's lead and
also began changing how they regulated the BOCs. 7' This shift in
regulatory policy substantially eliminated the attractiveness of crosssubsidizing. It no longer behooved the regulated entity to shift costs
because a shift would not necessarily result in a higher allowable
rate-the price it could charge consumers had a cap. Thus, to maximize profits, the regulated entity must either lower its costs, thereby
72
increasing its profit margin, or increase its consumer base.
66
Id, The elimination is called conditional because the Act permits BOGs to enter
the long-distance market for calls originating in their service areas only after satisfying the
requirements of 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-272 (Supp. II 1996). See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra
note 18, § 4.05[2] [a], at 4-54 n.55; infra notes 90-124 and accompanying text.
67
Robert B. Friedrich, Note, Regulatoy and Antitrust Implications of Emerging Competition in Local Access Telecommunications: How Congress and the FCC Can Encourage Competition
and TechnologicalProgress in Telecommunications, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 646, 659 (1995). But see
generally MAcAvoY, supranote 56, at 171-74 (concluding, on the basis of his 10-year study,
that the long-distance market never achieved a truly competitive state under the MFJ
regime).
68
See Chen, supra note 22, at 857 ("One of the FCC's finest moments came when it
approved price-cap regulation for dominant [long-distance] carriers (read: AT&T). This
technique freed the FCC from bothersome and ineffective techniques for computing the
rate base and guarding against cross-subsidies to unregulated affiliates." (footnotes
omitted)).
69
See HAMBURG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 4.04[1] [f], at 4-40 to 4-41.
70
See id. at 4-41 ("Under price-cap regulation, ... [t]he firm... selects rates at or
below the cap. This allows carriers to increase profits through increased efficiency and
market innovation, which, ideally, results in savings for consumers." (footnote omitted)).
71 See id.
72
Of course, regulated entities still had some incentive to cross-subsidize. See, e.g.,
HAMBuRG & BROTMAN, supra note 19, § 4.04[1], at 4-43. Nonetheless, price-cap regulation
certainly removed considerable benefits previously available under the rate-of-return
regulation.
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The FCC also sought to enact other regulations to increase competition in the long-distance market. In the early 1990s, the FCC reverted to its 1983 policy and announced plans to relieve all
nondominant long-distance carriers (read: everyone but AT&T) from
tariff-filing requirements. 73 Tariffs are statements to the FCC detailing the rates a long-distance carrier intends to charge customers. The
FCC had required tariffs to verify that the carriers' rates complied with
Commission regulations.7 4 This proposed change provided nondominant carriers with two substantial benefits. First, nondominant carriers would save the expense and time involved with filing. Second, and
more importantly, because the FCC still required AT&T to file tariffs,
the other carriers could review AT&T's rates and then undercut
AT&T's prices. 75 However, the Supreme Court invalidated this policy
in 1994, holding that the Commission had overstepped its statutory
bounds. 76 The Court recognized, however, that blame should not rest
necessarily on the Commission because it unfortunately had to con77
tinue laboring under an Act written for obsolete technology.

While the Court was charging Congress with ducking its public
duties, telecommunications technology continued to evolve. 78 In particular, cellular and Personal Communications Services (PCS) gradually became viable wireless alternatives to traditional wireline service.7 9
As the FCC's efforts to promote competition in the long-distance market met judicial resistance, the BOCs' wireline empire looked increasingly vulnerable to the new communications technologies. 80 It finally
had become apparent that real competition could exist within and
between the local and long-distance markets. As a result, "the MFJ
court and the FCC had reached the limits of their legal authority and
institutional competence .... [Therefore, t]he task of 'introduc[ing]
...
a whole new regime of regulation (or of free-market competi81
tion)' would fall upon Congress."
See Chen, supra note 22, at 857-58.
74 Cf.id. (noting that other long-distance companies used AT&T's tariff filings to set
their prices).
75 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1994).
76 See id. at 234.
77 . See id. (noting that the FCC must act within the authority of the Act because its
.estimations[ ] of desirable policy cannot alter the meaning of the federal Communications Act of 1934").
78 See Chen, supra note 22, at 855 ("As had previous regimes of telecommunications
law, the MFJ fell victim to technological change.").
79 See id. at 855-56.
80 Chen argues that BOCs "are in fact the more vulnerable players in any competitive
scenario combining wireless [local-exchange] service with fiber optic [long-distance] transmission." Id. at 856.
81 Id. at 858-59 (quoting MC, 512 U.S. at 234) (second and third alterations in original); accord Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
73
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Against this background, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Title I of the Act contains sweeping changes
designed to introduce competition to all aspects of the telephony industry.8 2 The 1996 Act requires the BOGs to cooperate with competitors in opening the local markets to competition,8 3 and § 271 of the
Act replaces the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions on long-distance
markets.8 4 Under § 271, the BOGs once again may enter the longdistance markets.8 5 Mindful of the industry's monopolistic history,
Congress conditioned the BOGs' re-entry on a number of requirements. 86 Congress also charged the FCC with reviewing the BOCs'
applications for compliance with these requirements. 87 Undoubtedly,
the crux of the 1996 Act is to facilitate competition within and between the local and long-distance markets. The media praised the Act
as promising increased services and lower prices for American consumers.88 Unfortunately, the consumer has yet to reap any significant
benefit the 1996 Act allegedly sowed. Indeed, many have commented
that the effect of the 1996 Act thus far has been the exact opposite of
what Congress intended.8 9

82
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 61-107
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-276 (Supp. II 1996)).
83 The primary vehicle by which the 1996 Act seeks to open the local markets is the
requirement that BOGs negotiate interconnection agreements with competitors. See id.
§§ 251-252. In the words of FCC Chairman Kennard, "One of the Telecom Act's potentially most powerful provisions is its requirement that incumbent telephone companies
lease portions of their networks to competitors." William E. Kennard, Speech to the Annual
Convention of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Nov. 10, 1997, available in 1997 FCC LEXIS 6138, at *11.
84 See Hundt Subcomm. Statemen supra note 7, at 17 ("Section 271 is, of course, the
Telecom Act's successor to the line of business restrictions contained in the Consent Decree that broke up AT&T in 1982.").
85 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1).
86 See Chen, supra note 22, at 861 ("Demonstrating persistent concerns over crosssubsidies and self-preference, the Act conditions full [BOC] entry into [the long-distance
market] upon a showing of significant competition in the [BOCs' local] markets.").
87 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (3).
88
See supranote 3.
89 See, e.g., Mark Landler, After a Year of Law, Scant Competition, N.Y. TaMEs, Dec. 23,
1996, at Dl ("Since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 became law, the cable television
industry has largely abandoned its foray into the telephone business. The regional phone
companies have shelved their efforts to get into television. And the three big long-distance
carriers have put through their steepest rate increases in several years."); see also, e.g., Mike
Mills & Paul Farhi, This Is a FreeMarket? The TelecommunicationsAct So Far: HigherPices,Few
Benefits, WASH. PosTJan. 19, 1997, at HI (noting that "1996 was hardly a bellwether for the
kind of consumer benefits promised by the law's supporters").
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11
THE SECTION 271 APPLICATION PROCESS AND THE FCC
APPROACH DURING THE FIRST Two YEARS OF

TE 1996 ACT

Under the 1996 Act, a BOC must apply to the FCC for permission
to enter the long-distance market.0 0 This procedure is referred to as
the § 271 application process. Nineteen ninety-seven marked the first
year in which any BOC filed a § 271 application with the FCC; that
year three different BOCs filed a total of four applications. 9 1 The FCC
denied all four applications.9 2 Additionally, one BOC refiled its § 271
application in July 1998, which the FCC also rejected. 93 In short, the
Commission has yet to allow a BOC to provide long-distance service,
even though three years have passed since Congress enacted the 1996
Act.
This Part starts by detailing both the statutory framework that
governs the application process and the various hurdles a BOC must
clear prior to receiving permission to enter the long-distance market.
This Part also examines the respective roles Congress assigned to the
FCC, the Department ofJustice (DOJ), and the state PUCs. 94 Finally,
this Part reviews in detail the four § 271 applications BOCs filed in
90 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1).
91 Southwestern Bell, Ameritech, and BellSouth are the three BOGS to have filed applications. SBC fied in Oklahoma, Ameritech fied in Michigan, and BellSouth filed in
both South Carolina and Louisiana. See Brief in Support of Application by BellSouth for
Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana, BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R.
6245 (1998) (No. 97-231) [hereinafter BellSouth Louisiana Application] (on fie with
FCC); Brief in Support of Application by BellSouth for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA
Services in South Carolina, BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (No. 97-208) [hereinafter BellSouth SC Application] (on fie with FCC); Brief in Support of Application by
Ameritech Michigan for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Michigan, Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543 (1997) (No. 97-137) [hereinafter Ameritech Michigan Application] (on file with FCC); Brief in Support of Application by SBC Communications
Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Long Distance for
Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Oklahoma, SBC Communications Inc., 12
F.C.C.R- 8685 (1997) (No. 97-121) [hereinafter SBC Oklahoma Application] (on file with

FCC).

92 See BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 6245 (1998) (BellSouth Louisiana Order); BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (BellSouth SC Order); Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R.
20,543 (1997); SBC Communications, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 8685 (1997).
93 See BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599 (1998) (Second BellSouth Louisiana Order). Notwithstanding the FCC's recognition of the improvements BellSouth had made
since its last Louisiana filing, the Commission again rejected BellSouth's application. See
id. at 20,601-03. At the time this Note went to print, no other BOC had filed a § 271
application with the FCC.
94 Congress gave all three organizations an integral role in the § 271 process. See 47
U.S.C. § 271(d) (2) (stating that the FCC is to consult with the Attorney General and the
state commission); id. § 271(d) (3) (charging the FCC with "approving or denying the authorization requested" by the BOC). Some controversy exists as to the roles of each entity
and what weight the FCC must accord to their respective decisions. See discussion infra
Part II.L2.
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1997 and the accompanying FCC denial orders. 95 The analysis highlights certain common issues that dominate the FCC's orders and
demonstrates how the FCC has adopted an extraordinarily stringent
review process. While the analysis shows that the FCC has justification
for resolving certain issues to the detriment of the BOCs, it also shows
that the FCC could have exercised considerably more leniency in several instances.
A.

The Mechanics of Section 271

The overarching purpose of § 271 is to ensure that the requesting
96
BOC adequately has opened its own local market to competition.
The 1996 Act does not require that potential local market entrants
establish their own local wireline networks; 97 economic reality precludes this requirement. 98 Instead, the Act propounds a framework in
which an incumbent BOC must allow access to its network for new
competitors. 99 A BOC, therefore, must permit a new local-service
market entrant to interconnect with its network, and the BOC further
must provide nondiscriminatory access to many of its basic network
functions. 10 0 Section 271's purpose is ensuring that a requesting BOC
has taken adequate steps to comply with these underlying requirements, thereby genuinely allowing new entrants the opportunity to
compete in the local markets. 1°1 The critical question becomes: How
should the FCC define "opened"?

95 This Note does not discuss in great detail the fifth application fied with the FCC.
This application largely mirrors the first BellSouth Louisiana application, discussed infra
Part H.B.4, and therefore does not appreciably add to the overall analysis.
96
See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.G.R. at 20,551.
97 Cf H.1. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.S.CALN. 124,
160 ("[1]t is unlikely that competitors'will have a fully redundant network in place when
they initially offer local service, because the investment necessary is so significant.").
98 See Sullivan, supra note 53, at 496 ("Technological and economic barriers to [localexchange] markets are high. Neither the presence of competitive access providers[,] prospective entry by [long-distance] carriers, nor the possibility of future bypass through cellular, PCS, or enhanced mobile radio systems ... alter this reality.").
99 See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,551 ("[Sections 251-253] of the Act require
incumbent LEGs, including BOGs, to share their networks in a manner that enables competitors to choose among three methods of entry into local telecommunications markets,
including those methods that do not require a new entrant, as an initial matter, to duplicate the incumbents' networks.").
100 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (a) (Supp. II1996); see also Chen, supra note 22, at 860 (discussing the requirements § 251 of the 1996 Act imposes on incumbent local exchange service
providers).
101
See Ameritech Mich., 12 FC.C.R. at 20,551 ("[The 1996 Act] requir[es] BOGs to
demonstrate that they have opened their local markets to competition before they are
authorized to enter into the in-region long distance market. .. ").
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The FourRequirements BOCs Must Satisfy in a Section 271
Application

Section 271 imposes four types of requirements on BOCs requesting permission from the FCC to provide long-distance service.' 0 2 As a
threshold matter, an applicant must meet either the Track A or Track
102 In an effort to give the reader a sense of how treacherous the § 271 requirements
are, the 14-point checklist, which is only one-fourth of the section's primary requirements,
appears below:
(c) Requirements for providing certain in-region interLATA services

(2) Specific interconnection requirements
(B) Competitive checklist
Access or interconnection provided or generally offered
by a Bell operating company to other telecommunications carriers meets the requirements of this subparagraph if such access and interconnection includes each of the following:
(i) Interconnection in accordance with the requirements of [47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c) (2) and 252(d) (1)].
(ii) Nondiscriminatory access to network elements
in accordance with the requirements of [47 U.S.C.
§§ 251(c) (3) and 252(d) (1)].
(iii) Nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts,
conduits, and rights-of-way owned or controlled by the
Bell operating company at just and reasonable rates in
accordance with the requirements of [47 U.S.C. § 224].
(iv) Local loop transmission from the central office
to the customer's premises, unbundled from local
switching or other services.
(v) Local transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier switch unbundled from
switching or other services.
(vi) Local switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services.
(vii) Nondiscriminatory access to(I) 911 and E911 services;
(II) directory assistance services to allow the
other carrier's customers to obtain telephone
numbers; and
(III) operator call completion services.
(viii) White pages directory listings for customers of
the other carrier's telephone exchange service.
(ix) Until the date by which telecommunications
numbering administration guidelines, plan, or rules are
established, nondiscriminatory access to telephone
numbers for assignment to the other carrier's telephone exchange service customers. After that date,
compliance with such guidelines, plan, or rules.
(x) Nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing and
completion.
(xi) Until the date by which the Commission issues
regulations pursuant to [47 U.S.C. § 251] to require
number portability, interim telecommunications
number portability through remote call forwarding, direct inward dialing trunks, or other comparable arrangements, with as little impairment of functioning,
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B requirements of § 271 (c) (1).103 A BOC must show that either (1) a
facilities-based competitor currently exists within its market (Track A)
or (2) the BOC has offered to provide competitors with access and
interconnection to its network but no alternative provider has elected
to accept the offer (Track B).104 More specifically, Track A examines
whether the BOC "has entered into one or more binding [interconnection] agreements... under which the Bell operating company is
providing access and interconnection to its network facilities for...
one or more unaffiliated competing providers of telephone exchange
service... to residential and business subscribers."' 0 5 In short, a BOC
can meet this requirement if it faces competition in its local-service
market from a new, unaffiliated entrant. 10 6 On the other hand, a
BOC can satisfy Track B if both (1) "no [competing] provider has
requested the access and interconnection described in [Track A],"
and (2) the BOC has filed an approved "statement of the terms and
conditions that the company generally offers" to any provider who
eventually desires interconnection with the BOC.'0 7 Track B contemplates that the FCC should not preclude a BOC's entering the longdistance market merely because no competitors have sought to compete with it.108 In sum, this initial threshold requirement ensures that
either some modicum of competition exists in the BOC's market or
the BOC is not at fault for the lack of competitive inroads.
quality, reliability, and convenience as possible. After
that date, full compliance with such regulations.
(xii) Nondiscriminatory access to such services or
information as are necessary to allow the requesting carrier to implement local dialing parity in accordance
with the requirements of [47 U.S.C. § 251(b) (3)].
(xiii) Reciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with the requirements of [47 U.S.C.
§ 252(d) (2)].
(xiv) Telecommunications services are available for
resale in accordance with the requirements of [47
U.S.C. §§ 251(c) (4) and 252(d) (3)].
47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (Supp. II 1996).
103 See id. § 271(c)(1). Section 271(c) (1) is divided into two subparts. A BOG may
satisfy either of two subparts, commonly discussed as Track A (referring to 47 U.S.C.
§ 271(c)(1)(A)) and Track B (referring to 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B)). See, e.g., Amefitech
Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,548 (discussing the Track A and Track B requirements).
104
See47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1).
105
Ild.
§ 271 (c) (1) (A).
106 See SBC Communications Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, 8695 (1997) ("We find that the
use of the term 'competing provider[ ]' in section 271(c) (1) (A) suggests that there must
be an actual commercial alternative to the BOC in order to satisfy section 271(c) (1) (A)."
(alteration in original)).
107 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B).
108 SeeBellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539, 566 (1997) (BellSouth SC Order) ("[Track B
should] ensure that potential competitors will not be permitted to delay indefinitely BOG
entry by failing to provide the type of telephone exchange service described in Track A."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The second § 271 requirement asks the FCC to determine
whether the, BOG satisfies the "[c]ompetitive checklist" in
§ 271 (c) (2) (B) .109 The checklist represents the heart of the § 271 application process. 110 Its fourteen, discrete requirements each strive to
guarantee that the BOC fairly and equitably provides competitors with
access and interconnection. Essentially, the BOC must treat competitors' customers as it treats its own customers."' The checklist requirements range from requiring nondiscriminatory access to both network
elements 1 2 and 911 services 113 to mandating that BOCs allow compet4
itors to choose and assign telephone numbers to their customers."
As discussed further below, the FCC has focused most of its energy on
condemning the BOCs' compliance with a handful of the checklist
items. 115
Section 271's third requirement demands that the BOC demonstrate how, should the FCC approve its application, it will provide interIATA service in accordance with § 272.116 Section 272 stipulates,
in pertinent part, that approved BOCs provide long-distance service
through separate affiliates. 117 For example, BellSouth established separate corporate entities to operate its local and long-distance services:
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and BellSouth Long Distance,
Inc." 8 This provision addresses the issue of self-preference and seeks
to "prevent a Bell company from providing its long distance affiliate
with an unfair advantage over competitors."' " 9 Several reporting and
auditing requirements in § 272 help ensure that the BOC adhere to
120
these provisions.
109

47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2) (B). This section appears in full supra note 102.
Cf Sullivan, supra note 53, at 492 ("The competitive checklist in Section 271(c) (2)
and the FCC regulations attempt to assure that local competition is in fact occurring
through interconnection, unbundling, and nondiscriminatory access."). As the discussion
below shows, the checklist requirements comprise the bulk of the FCC's discussion in its
orders. The FCC has focused on clarifying this area of the § 271 process. See infra Part
II.B.
Ill See, e.g., 13 F.C.C.R. at 585 (BellSouth SC Order) ("To compete effectively in the
local exchange market, new entrants must be able to provide service to their customers at a
quality level that matches the service provided by the incumbent LEC.").
112
See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(il).
113 See id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(I).
"14 Seeid. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi).
115 See infra Part II.B (highlighting that the FCC repeatedly has reproached the BOGS
for inadequate Operational Support Systems, access to network elements, and policies for
reselling certain already-discounted services).
116
See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (3) (B).
117 See id. § 272(a)(2)(B)-(C).
118 See BellSouth SC Application, supranote 91, at 1, 58.
119 BellSouth Louisiana Application, supranote 91, at 74. For a discussion concerning
the principle of self-preference, a prevalent concern when addressing perceived monopolies, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
120
See 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)-(d). Certain structural safeguards deal with the organizational structure of the BOC and its separate affiliate. See, e.g., id. § 272(b) (2) (requiring
110
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Finally, § 271 requires the FCC to approve only those BOG applications "consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.' 2 ' Because the FCC has rejected on the basis of other § 271
requirements all BOC applications to date, it has yet to definitively
interpret this requirement. However, the Commission, to provide guidance for future BOC applicants, extensively discussed the issue in its
Ameritech Michigan Order.122 In that order, the FCC indicated that it
views the public interest requirement as another potentially substantial hurdle for a BOC applicant to clear. 123 The Commission summarized its view of the requirement by stating: "[O]ur public interest
inquiry requires us to examine carefully a number of factors, including the nature and extent of competition in the applicant's local market, in order to determine whether that market is and will remain
24
open to competition."'
2.

The Role of the State PUCs and the DOJ

Under § 271 (d) (2) the FCC must consult with both the Attorney
General and the applicable state commission when evaluating a BOC
application. 125 The Attorney General may use "any standard [she]
considers appropriate" to evaluate the application. 126 The state commission's role is more marginal: The FCC must consider only the state
PUC's determination concerning the BOC's compliance with either
Track A or Track B and with the competitive checklist requirements127
the first two of the four requirements highlighted above.

the affiliate to maintain records separate from the records of the BOC). Another stipulates
that all transactions between the BOG and the affiliate take place at "arm's length." Id.
§ 272(b) (5). A nondiscrimination safeguard admonishes the BOC to deal with its separate
affiliate in the same manner as it deals with other entities. See id. § 272(c). The provision
requiring biennial audits provides that independent auditors periodically will check the
BOG and its affiliates for compliance with § 272. See id. § 272(d).
121 Id. § 271(d) (3) (C).
122 SeeAmeritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 20,741-51 (1997).
123 The FCC supported a broad interpretation of its public interest analysis by citing
legislative history and stating that "Congress intended the Commission, in evaluating section 271 applications, to perform its traditionally broad public interest analysis of whether
a proposed action or authorization would further the purposes of the Communications
Act." Id. at 20,744.
124 Id. at 20,751.
125 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2).
126 Id. § 271(d) (2) (A).
127
Section 271(d) (2) (B) requires the FCC to "consult with the State commission...
in order to verify the compliance of the [BOG] with the requirements of subsection (c)."
Id. § 271(d) (2) (B). Section 271(c) (1) details the Track A and Track B requirements, and
§ 271(c) (2) outlines the competitive checklist. See id. § 271(c).
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The 1996 Act does not state specifically what weight the FCC
should accord either party's evaluation. 12 8 The importance of a collaborative effort, however, is unmistakable. Each party possesses certain strengths that Congress wished to utilize.' 29 Certainly the 1996
Act anticipates that the FCC will be the dominant decision-making
agency. Almost equally certain, however, is that Congress did not intend for the FCC to ignore the knowledge and expertise of these
other state and federal agencies.
B.

The First Wave of BOC Applications

During the 1996 Act's first two years of operation, BOCs filed a
total of four applications to provide interLATA service: SBC applied to
provide service in Oklahoma, Ameritech applied to provide service in
Michigan, and BellSouth applied to provide service in both South Carolina and Louisiana. 3 0 The FCC rejected all four applications. 3 1 An
analysis of the applications and accompanying rejection orders shows
how remarkably wide the gulf between the FCC and the BOCs remains. To be sure, they are making some progress: the FCC pointed
out, in the various BOC applications, several deficiencies that could
have anticompetitive effects in the telecommunications market, and
the BOCs have often responded to the FCC's concerns in a positive
manner. The analysis does show, however, that the FCC has contributed immensely to the delay in the 1996 Act's implementation. Indeed, the FCC's § 271 orders have led many commentators to
132
describe its approach as overly detail-oriented.
1.

SBC's Oklahoma Application

Of the four BOC applications filed in 1997, SBC's application to
provide service in Oklahoma was the weakest, and the FCC accorded
it curt treatment. 13 3 SBC argued that it faced facilities-based competi128 The statute does say that the FCC must give the Attorney General's opinion "substantial weight." Id. § 271 (d) (2) (A). This obviously vague standard leaves the FCC largely
on its own to determine the weight it accords the opinion.
129 See CollaborativeApproach, supra note 17, at *8 ("[We must also] defer[ ] to [the
State Commissions' and the Justice Department's] judgments, according to the unique
strengths and perspectives they each bring to the local market-opening process.").
130 See supra note 91.

131

See supra note 92.

132

See, e.g., DUESrERBERG & CORDON, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that the FCC has

micromanaged the deregulatory process and asking: "Have regulators failed to be aggressive enough in implementing the act, or have they attempted to undermine its intent?").
133 While not necessarily an accurate measure of how strong the FCC perceives applications, the number of paragraphs in the respective orders offers some evidence that the
FCC thought little of SBC's application. The FCC denied SBC's application in a mere 71
paragraphs. See SBC Communications Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 8685 (1997). Contrast this with
the denial of Ameritech's application, which spanned 408 paragraphs. See Ameritech
Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543 (1997).
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tion, satisfying the Track A requirements, as a result of a single competitor, Brooks Fiber, that had an approved interconnection
agreement. 3 4 At the time of the application, Brooks Fiber offered
local service to a handful of its own employees on a test basis. 13 5 The
initial skirmish between the FCC and SBC focused on the meaning of
the phrase "competing providers of telephone exchange service" in
§ 271's Track A provision.' 3 6 SBC maintained that Brooks Fiber would
38
be providing residential service.' 3 7 The FCC rejected this argument
and chose to interpret "competing providers" as requiring "an actual
commercial alternative to the BOC['s local service]. 'u 39 A single competitor providing local service to a group of employees did not satisfy
this standard. The FCC correctly reasoned that Congress surely envisioned that some appreciable level of competition must exist prior to
allowing a BOG's entry into the long-distance market under Track A,
and no such competition existed in Oklahoma at the time.
The FCC also summarily rejected SBC's interpretation of Track
14
0
B. The FCC interpreted the phrase "qualifying request" to mean a
request for interconnection that can lead to the type of facilities-based
competition Track A specifies. 141 For example, the FCC likely would
consider as a qualifying request a MCIWorldcom proposal to SBC that
the two companies negotiate an interconnection agreement to allow
MCIWorldcom to compete with SBC in Oklahoma City. The FCC
noted that SBC had received several of these requests and thereby
could not proceed under Track B. 14 2 As with the FCC's Track A determination, its Track B interpretation comports much more comforta43
bly with the statute than SBC's alternative.
By finding that SBC did not satisfy either Track A or B, the FCC
did not need to elaborate on how it intended to interpret the remaining § 271 requirements. It is notable, however, that the FCC refused
See SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at 8-12.
See SBC CommunicationsInc., 12 F.G.C.R. at 8691, 8696-99.
136
47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1) (A) (Supp. II 1996).
137 See SBC Communications Inc., 12 F.C.G.R. at 8697-98.
138
See id. at 8698 ("[W]e cannot conclude for purposes of section 271(c) (1) (A) that a
carrier is a competing provider of telephone exchange service to residential subscribers if
it is not even accepting requests for that service.").
'39
Id. at 8695.
140
See id. at 8703.
141
See id. at 8701-02 ("We conclude that a 'qualifying request' under section
271(c) (1) (B) is a request for negotiation to obtain access and interconnection that, if implemented, would satisfy the requirements of section 271 (c) (1) (A).").
142
See id. at 8723-24. The FCC also noted that SBC had frustrated their competitors'
.efforts to enter the local exchange market." Id. at 8724.
143
SBC argued that a competitor must not only request interconnection, but also must
have begun to provide facilities-based service. See SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note
91, at 14. The FCC characterized this argument by stating that, "SBC seems to take the
position that, if it has not satisfied the requirements of section 271(c) (1) (A), then it must
be eligible to proceed under Track B." SBC CommunicationsInc., 12 F.C.C.R. at 8700.
134

135
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to follow the determination of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC), the state body in charge of regulating SBC's activities
within Oklahoma. 144 Although the FCC certainly must "make an independent determination of the meaning of statutory terms in section
271,1145 the statutory scheme expressly envisions a role for the state

commission. This role requires the FCC to consult with the state commission on Track A and Track B matters.1 46 In this case, the OCC
conducted hearings in front of an administrative lawjudge and found
that SBC satisfied the Track A requirements.1 47 The FCC rejected this
judgment and rebuked the OCC for not enunciating precisely how it
made its determination. 4 8 In this particular case, the FCC appears to
have had valid grounds for not following the state commission's findings and recommendations. The FCC's quick disposal of the OCC's
determination nonetheless is telling: the FCC established that it will
not hesitate to ignore the findings of a state commission with which
§ 271 mandates it to consult.
The FCC also indicated to future applicants that it might wait
some time before ultimately approving the first BOC application. In
discussing SBC's contention that it could proceed under Track B, the
FCC stated that its rules implementing § 251, the statutory provisions
requiring BOCs to arrive at interconnection agreements with competing carriers, "envisioned that incumbent [BOCs] would need some
time to complete these necessary steps." 149 The FCC then reiterated
that it had issued previous orders implementing the 1996 Act in antici15 0
pation that some time would pass before a BOC could satisfy them.
It bolstered its argument by claiming that Congress envisioned a
"'ramp-up' period during which" new entrants in the local market
could implement their interconnection agreements. 15 ' These state144 See SBC Communications Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. at 8695 ("[We find that the Oklahoma
Commission's determination on this issue is not dispositive.").
145
Id.
146
See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2) (B) (Supp. II 1996); supra Part IIA1.2.
147 See SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at 6-12.
148
See SBC CommunicationsInc., 12 F.C.C.R. at 8695 ("Moreover, based on the record
before us, we find that it is unclear what standard the Oklahoma Commission applied or
what specific facts it relied on in making its determination .... ."); see also id. at 8698 ("[W] e
do not attach significant evidentiary weight to the Oklahoma Commission's unsubstantiated assertion that [a potential competitor] has begun media advertisements seeking to
attract both business and residential customers." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
149
Id. at 8710.
150 See id. at 8711 (acknowledging that it may take time for the BOCs fully to implement the local competition regulations it promulgated in Local Competition Provisions in
Telecomm. Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R 15,499 (1996), vacated in par4 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC,
120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part and rev'd in partsub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 721 (1999) and subsequent orders).
151 Id. at 8723.
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ments provided the first hints of the FCC's intent to adopt a detailed
approach to the § 271 process.
2.

Ameritech's Michigan Application

In May 1997, Ameritech filed an application to provide long-distance service in Michigan. 152 The FCC's order denying Ameritech the
right to provide long-distance service constitutes the most elaborate
and thorough of the four FCC orders this Note addresses. In the
Ameritech Michigan Order, the FCC laid out its position on a number of
53
the § 271 requirements to provide guidance to future applicants.'
Embodied in this guidance, which undoubtedly will prove beneficial
in certain respects, are the seeds of the FCC's plan to review applications in excruciating detail.
a.

Compliance with Track A Requirements

The FCC found that Ameritech satisfied the Track A requirements, thereby clearing the first statutory hurdle. 54 The evidence in
the record demonstrated that Brooks Fiber, one of three facilitiesbased competitors Ameritech's application cited, provided substantial
service to both business and residential customers in several Michigan
cities. 55 As it did in its SBC Oklahoma Order, the FCC adopted interpretations of various Track A provisions in a manner that favored the
BOC.156 Predictably, numerous long-distance carriers submitted comments advocating novel constructions of the Track A requirements
under which Ameritech would fail to comply. 57 The FCC, however,
took a more reasonable approach. It looked only to see if the competSee Ameritech Michigan Application, supranote 91.
See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R 20,543, 20,600 (1997).
154 See id. at 20,578.
155 The data supplied by Brooks Fiber show that it had 15,876 business lines and 5,910
residential lines in service in Grand Rapids, Michigan. See Opposition of Brooks Fiber
Communications of Michigan to Ameritech's Application at 8, Ameritech Mich. (No. 97137). These data alone, without regard to other cities Brooks Fiber serves, satisfy the Track
A requirements. Track A simply requires a competitor to have a binding interconnection
agreement with the incumbent BOC under which the competitor is providing competing
access service to residential and business customers. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1) (A) (Supp. II
1996).
156
See, e.g., Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,581-83 (rejecting the argument that the
phrase "binding agreement" within § 271(c) (1) (A) excludes interconnection agreements
with only interim prices rather than final prices); id. at 20,584-86 (rejecting the argument
that the phrase "competing provider" in § 271(c) (1) (A) contemplates a certain level of
geographic penetration or market share).
157 See, e.g., Comments of AT&T Corp. in Opposition to Ameritech's Section 271 Application for Michigan at 35-37, Ameritech Mich. (No. 97-137) [hereinafter AT&T Ameritech
Comments] (claiming that a competitor that chooses to purchase network elements from
the incumbent BOG, and then combines the purchased elements to provide competitive
access service, does not satisfy § 271's requirement that the competing carrier provide service using its own facilities).
152
153

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1442

[Vol. 84:1418

ing carrier represented "an actual commercial alternative to the
BOG'

2 58

and offered "service exclusively over its own telephone ex-

change service facilities.' 5 9 However, the FCC laid the groundwork
for a potentially contentious issue in the future. In finding that Track
A does not require the BOG to face any specific level of competition,
the FCC expressly noted its intent to review competition levels in the
local markets as part of any future public interest analysis under
§ 271(d) (3) (C). 160 Whether Congress intended the statute's public
interest analysis to include this type of searching, data-oriented review
remains debatable. 16 '
b.

Checklist Compliance

The FCC denied Ameritech's application on the ground that it
did not fully satisfy the checklist requirements of § 271 (c) (2) (B).162
The FCC clearly reveals in this part of the order its decision to review
applications in great detail. Tellingly, its voluminous discussion on
the checklist requirements begins by noting that "a complete discussion of only certain checklist items [is included.]"163 It then devotes
over eighty pages of the FCC Record to discussing three of the fourteen
checklist items.'6
A bulk of the order discusses Ameritech's Operational Support
Systems (OSS).165 BOCs use OSS to execute pre-ordering, ordering,
provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing functions. 16 6 The
second checklist item requires the BOC to provide competing carriers
158

159

Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,585.
Id. at 20,599.

160
See id. at 20,584 n.168 ("Information on the level of geographic penetration is relevant to our assessment of whether 'the requested authorization is consistent with the public
interest.' We therefore expect parties to provide this information in future section 271
applications." (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (3) (C)) (citation omitted)).
161
Compare Finn, supra note 5, at 216-23 (advocating that the FCC's public interest
analysis include an examination of factors bearing on the level of competition present in
the local exchange market), with Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 67
n.77 (asserting that Congress "emphatically rejected" a proposal for the FCC to add metric
requirements, bearing on the extent of local competition, under the guise of a public
interest analysis).
162
See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,599.
163
Id.
164
See id. at 20,612-93.
165
See id. at 20,612-61.
166
See id. at 20,613. As a simple example of what each of these functions would include, consider an average residential consumer. Before a carrier provides service to the
consumer it must perform a background check to confirm the address and other relevant
information. This type of activity is the pre-ordering function. During the ordering phase,
the carrier places the customer order and tells her when she can expect to have the service
installed. The carrier then installs her service as a part of the provisioning phase. Should
she ever need her service repaired, the carrier will enter the request, send instructions to
the repair personnel, and tell her when she can expect to have her problem resolved.
Finally, in the billing phase, the carrier's relevant systems generate the customer's bill.
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with nondiscriminatory access to these systems. 16 7 In outlining what
compliance entails, the FCC divided its inquiry into two parts:
First, the Commission must determine whether the BOC has
deployed the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient
access to each of the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC
is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them. Second,
the Commission must determine whether the OSS functions that
the BOC has deployed are operationally ready, as a practical
68
matter.'
A sample of the FCC's deliberations illustrates how comprehensive the Commission intends to be under both prongs of its proffered
analysis. For example, the FCC stated that the BOC must provide
"nondiscriminatory access" to the OSS ordering function. 169 Ameritech provided extensive empirical evidence of the degree to which
competitors have been able to use Ameritech's ordering and provisioning systems. 170 This evidence included a comparison between
competing carriers and Ameritech of three ordering and provisioning
benchmarks: the percentage of customer due dates each met, the percentage of new service failures, and the percentage of installations
each completed outside of a six-day interval. 171 Ameritech further
noted that competing providers include required performance standards as part of their negotiated interconnection agreements with
Ameritech. 17 2 These agreements often provide for penalties if Ameritech fails to meet the contractual performance standards.' 75 Despite
167

Section

271(c)(2)(B)(ii)

specifically

states

that

BOCs

must

offer

"[n]ondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the requirements of
sections 251(c) (3) and 252(d) (1) of this tide." 47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2) (B) (ii) (Supp. II
1996). OSS are considered to be network elements as defined by § 251(c) (3). See Iowa
Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1997) (confirming FCC finding that OSS
qualify as network elements), affid in part and reu'd in part sub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
168 Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.tR at 20,616.
169
Id. at 20,630.
170 See Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 32-33.
171 See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R at 20,630 n.410. Ameritech succinctly described
how it generated and provided performance measures:
With respect to resale, Ameritech has agreed to (a) measure in a
clearly defined manner the quality and timeliness of services it provides to
resellers using the same criteria that it uses to measure the comparable services it provides to its own retail customers, and (b) generate monthly reports for each competing carrier that (i) numerically and graphically show
these measurements (and the underlying data) for the carrier and
(ii) compare those measurements to the same measurements for services
provided to Ameritech's retail customers, and for services provided to
Ameritech's affiliates and other competing carriers.
Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 33-34.
172
See Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 31-33.
173 See id. at 35.
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Ameritech's data and potential contractual liability for penalties, the
FCC wanted to see specific data reporting and comparing average installation intervals for Ameritech's and competing providers' retail
customers.' 74 Despite the data that Ameritech did provide, the absence of this particular type of performance measure prompted the
FCC to state that "[b]y failing to provide such data in this application,
Ameritech has failed to meet its evidentiary burden."' 75 By not meeting this burden, Ameritech failed to prove that it "is providing nondiscriminatory access to [the] OSS [ordering] function[ ].,1176
The FCC also questioned the operational readiness of Ameritech's billing systems. Ameritech acknowledged that it inadvertently
had double-billed some customers of competing carriers.177 As Ameritech pointed out, however, it immediately made resolution of the
7
double-billing problem a priority and diligently sought a solution.
Nonetheless, the FCC found "that the double-billing problem is compelling evidence that Ameritech's OSS for ordering and provisioning
for resale services is not operationally ready, and therefore, Ameritech
is not providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions.' ' 79 Ameritech argued that the FCC was holding it to an impossibly high standard. 8 0 Given the complexity of the technology involved, Ameritech
maintained that some errors were unavoidable. 8 1 The company contended that these errors did not affect materially the overall operational readiness of its systems.' 8 2 The FCC rejected this contention,
83
reiterating that it found the double-billing issue problematic.
These perceived shortfalls formed the primary basis of the FCC's
determination that Ameritech had failed to satisfy the checklist requirements. 84 All of these shortfalls occurred in only the second
174
175
176

177
178

179
180

See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.RI
Id. at 20,634.

at 20,631.

Id.

See id. at 20,650.
See id. at 20,651.
Id. at 20,652.

See Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 27 ("[T]he complaints of
AT&T and other carriers suggest that they seek to hold Ameritech's OSS interfaces to an
impossibly high 'bug-free' standard that no information technologies system or application
could ever meet.").
181 See id. ("No information technologies system or application-whether designed for
and used by the telecommunications industry, state or federal governments, the personal
computer industry or some other manufacturing or service sector of the economy-is completely devoid of troubles or bugs." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
182
See id. at 28 & n.25.
183
See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.G.R. at 20,652 ("While we agree that Ameritech should
not be held to a standard of perfection in demonstrating that its OSS functions are operationally ready, we find that double-billing, as well as [other problems previously discussed],
constitute[s) problems fundamental to Ameritech's ability to provide nondiscriminatory
access to OSS functions.").
184
See id. at 20,612.
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checklist requirement: the one stating that the BOG must provide
"[n]ondiscriminatory access to network elements."'u 5 While the FCC
also questioned Ameritech's compliance with other checklist require86
ments, it devoted minimal discussion to each of them.
c.

Compliance with SeparateAffiliate Requirements

The FCC next found that Ameritech did not satisfy § 272's requirement that the applicant provide long-distance service only
through a separate affiliate.' 8 7 Section 272(b) (3) requires a BOC's
long-distance affiliate to "have separate officers, directors, and employees from the [BOG] of which it is an affiliate."' 8 8 As it noted in
89
the application, no Ameritech entities have boards of directors.'
Without questioning Ameritech's assertion that its local and long-distance affiliates did not share any officers or employees, the FCC zeroed in on the separate directors requirement. 9 0 After parsing
Ameritech's corporate structure, Michigan corporate law, and Delaware corporate law, despite conceding that "complete independence
of management of the subsidiary will not always be possible,"' 9 1 the
FCC determined that Ameritech and its long-distance affiliate did not
92
have sufficiently separate management.
In addition, the Ameritech Michigan Order states that Ameritech
failed to demonstrate its intention to comply with § 272(b) (5),193
which requires the BOC and its affiliate to consummate all transactions at arm's length and make them "available for public inspection.' 9 4 Notably, § 272 imposes structural and operational
requirements that apply to the BOC afterit receives permission to provide long-distance service. 195 The FCC must make predictive judgments about whether the applicant will satisfy the various § 272
47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2) (B) (ii) (Supp. II 1996).
See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,662-724 (exhibiting a far shorter discussion to
other checklist items).
187
See id. at 20,725. For a more detailed discussion of the § 272 requirements and a
brief explanation of the economic rationale underlying them, see supranotes 117-20 and
accompanying text.
188 47 U.S.C. § 272(b) (3).
189 See Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 61.
190 See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R at 20,728.
191 Id. at 20,731.
192
See id. at 20,728-32 (discussing Michigan and Delaware corporate law, and concluding that Ameritech Corporation, the parent company of all Ameritech affiliates, has the
"responsibilities of a 'director' for both" the local and long-distance service affiliates).
193
See id. at 20,734.
194 47 U.S.C. § 272(b) (5) (Supp. I 1996).
195
See id. § 271(d) (3) (B) (stating that, when reviewing a § 271 application, the FCC
must find that "the requested authorization wil be carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272 of this tide" (emphasis added)).
185

186
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requirements, including § 272 (b) (5).196 This order indicates that the
FCC stands ready to use its "predictive judgment" as another tool to
scrutinize exceedingly closely BOC applications.
Perhaps the most telling example of the FCC's adoption of detailed evaluation standards is the Commission's finding that Ameritech would not satisfy the § 2 7 2 (g) restriction on joint marketing.
Under this provision, a BOC may market its long-distance affiliate's
services only if it informs customers that other long-distance service
providers are available.' 9 7 The FCC examined the script Ameritech's
telemarketers would use when talking to potential customers. 198 The
proposed script read:
You have a choice of companies, including Ameritech Long Distance, for long distance service. Would you like me to read from a
list of other available long distance companies or do you know
which company you would like?199
The FCC concluded that this script violated § 2 7 2(g) 20 0 and demanded that Ameritech adopt a script that randomly listed long-distance carriers with each new customer's

call. 20 '

Based on this

discussion, the FCC presumably stood ready to reject a § 271 application because it disapproved of a telemarketing script. The Commission apparently realized the foolhardiness of this finding and reversed
0 2 Ameritech's proits position in its BellSouth South Carolina Order.2
posed script now would pass muster.
d.

The Public Interest Inquiry

The Ameritech Michigan Order did not opine whether Ameritech
met the statutory requirement that its "requested authorization [be]
203
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity."
The FCC took the occasion, however, to explain what future BOC ap196

See Ameritech Mich., 12 FC.C.R at 20,734 ("[S]ection 271(d) (3) (B) requires the

Commission to make a predictive judgment regarding the future behavior of a section 271
applicant.").
197
See 47 U.S.C. § 27 2 (g) (1) ("A [BOG] affiliate... may not market or sell telephone
exchange services provided by the [BOC] unless that company permits other entities offering the same or similar service to market and sell its telephone exchange services.").
198 See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,737-38.
199

Id. at 20,737.

See id. at 20,738 (concluding that Ameritech did not satisfy § 2 7 2(g) because "not
only are BOCs required to provide customers requesting new local exchange service the
names of competing [long-distance] carriers, but they must provide these names in random order").
201
See id.
202
See BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R_ 539, at 671 (1997) (BellSouth SG Order) ("[We
find that the Commission's decision in the Ameritech Michigan Order placed too much
weight on the equal access obligations, and too little weight on the BOCs' right to jointly
market local and long distance services.").
203
47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C) (Supp. II 1996).
200
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plicants would have to do to satisfy this provision. 20 4 Even if a BOC
clears the first three § 271 hurdles, the Commission strongly indicated
that its public interest analysis would be quite probing and would require a BOG to submit myriad information.2 0 5 The FCC rejected in
favor of its own broad interpretation both Ameritech's and the DOJ's
20 6
views concerning the proper scope of the public interest inquiry.
The FCC articulated a standard by which it assesses various factors
bearing on competition within both the local and the long-distance
markets. 20 7 It expressly rejected the argument that it should view the
competitive checklist as limiting its public interest inquiry.20 8 Instead,
it enunciated certain, specific requirements that it expects from future BOG applicants. For example, the FCC expects future § 271 applications to contain (1) evidence that BOCs have "provided new
entrants with optional payment plans for the payment of non-recurring charges,"2 09 (2) information regarding state and local laws "that
may constitute barriers to entry... or that are intended to promote
such entry,"21 0 and (3) evidence bearing on whether the "applicant
21
has engaged in discriminatory or other anticompetitive conduct." '
3.

BellSouth's South CarolinaApplication

BellSouth's application marked the first time a BOG applied for
§ 271 approval primarily on the basis of Track B.2 1 2 BellSouth
claimed that the lack of substantial competition in South Carolina
could be attributed wholly to strategic business decisions made by potential market entrants.2 1 3 BellSouth pointed out that nothing ap204
See Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,742 (explaining that, while not pertinent to
this particular order, the FCC felt "it
would be useful to identify certain issues and make
certain inquiries for the benefit of future applicants... relating to the meaning and scope
of the public interest inquiry mandated by Congress").
205
See id. at 20,743-47.
206
See id. at 20,743-45. The FCC claimed that "Congress intended the Commission, in
evaluating section 271 applications, to perform its traditionally broad public interest analysis of whether a proposed action or authorization would further the purposes of the Communications Act." Id at 20,744.
207
See id. at 20,746.
208
See id. at 20,747 ("[W]e believe that compliance with the checklist will not necessarily assure that all barriers to entry to local telecommunications market have been eliminated, or that a BOC will continue to cooperate with new entrants after receiving inregion, interLATA authority.").
209
Id. at 20,749.
210 Id.
211
Id.
Note that SBC's application to provide long-distance service in Oklahoma sought
212
approval on the basis of Track B, see SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at 12-15,
and the FCC did discuss extensively the merits of this contention, see SBC Communications
Inc., 12 F.C.C.P. 8685, 8699-724 (1997). SBC first argued for Track A approval, however,
and its arguments under this track were considerably more extensive than those BellSouth
put forth.
213
See BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 14. As BellSouth argued:
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proaching the competition the 1996 Act envisioned existed in South
Carolina.2 1 4 Relying on this argument, and armed with unconditional
approval and support from its state commission, 21 5 BellSouth urged
the FCC to let market forces 'Jump-start competition" in both the local and long-distance markets.2 1 6 BellSouth also advanced a test-market theory, hypothesizing that South Carolina gave the FCC an
excellent opportunity to test the effects of approving a § 271 application. 2 17 The FCC declined the opportunity and denied BellSouth's
218
application.
The separate statements that several FCC commissioners attached
to the denial order demonstrate the strength of BellSouth's application. Three of the FCC's five commissioners, including the Chairman,
recognized the positive steps BellSouth had taken and acknowledged
that the § 271 application process has faults.2 19 Moreover, only a
short time after issuing this order, the FCC released its statement callThe [South Carolina Public Service Commission (SCPSC)] has confirmed

that [the competitor's] failure to move more quickly to launch facilitiesbased local service-particularly for residential customers-is due solely to
their own business decisions, for BellSouth has not "taken any action to
prevent or to retard the development of local competition in South
Carolina."
Id. (quoting BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., Order No. 97-640, No. 97-101-C, at 20 (Pub. Serv.
Comm'n S.C., July 31, 1997) (SCPSC compliance order) (on file with SCPSG)). As an
affiant for BellSouth pointed out, "The fact that facilities-based carriers have not entered
[BellSouth's] local markets in South Carolina... is a product of the state's market and
demographic conditions." Affidavit of Glenn A. Woroch at 35, BellSouth Corp., 13
F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (No. 97-208) [hereinafter BellSouth Woroch Affidavit].
Cf. BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at i ("Twenty months of experience
214
under the 1996 Act show[s] it is futile and enormously costly to delay interLATA competition while waiting for facilities-based local competition to spread to both business and residential customers.").
As more fully discussed infra Part II.B.3(a), the SCPSC found that BellSouth satis215
fied the Track B and competitive checklist requirements, and it recommended that the
FCC approve BellSouth's § 271 application.
BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at i ("Rather than relying solely on regula216
tion, the Commission can use its authority under section 271 to let market forces jumpstart competition in local and interLATA services.").
217
See id. ("South Carolina is the perfect laboratory for proving this more promising
approach .... ").
218
See 13 F.C.C.R. at 541 (BellSouth SC Order).
219 Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth quipped that "[ilt has been a good year for those
who earn a living through the industry of telecommunications regulation," and pointed
out that the Commission "commends BellSouth for its efforts and the progress that it has
made in opening its local market to competition." Id. at 682 (separate statement of Coin*missioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth). Commissioner Powell echoed the sentiments and recognized the deficiencies in the current § 271 process. See id. at 683 (separate statement of
Commissioner Michael K. Powell) ("I believe we must do more or adopt a new approach to
this process if we hope to provide the clarity that BOCs and new entrants need to open up
local markets."). Chairman Kennardjoined the chorus, stating that "BellSouth has made
significant progress towards opening the market for local telephone service in South Carolina." Id. at 676 (separate statement of Chairman William E. Kennard).
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ing for a "collaborative approach" to the application process. 22 0
These signs are positive for the BOCs, but only time will tell whether
the FCC's statements are truly a commitment to opening the markets
or merely rhetoric. 22 1 The BellSouth South Carolina Order itself suggests
that they are the latter. The FCC rejected the state commission's recommendations and denied BellSouth's application for failing to meet
both the Track B and the OSS-related checklist requirements.
a. Rejecting the South Carolina Commission's Recommendations
As in the SBC Oklahoma Order, the FCC chose to ignore the state
commission's recommendation that it allow BellSouth to compete in
the long-distance market. It is worth reiterating that the state commission is the agency with the most intimate knowledge concerning competition within its jurisdiction. 2 22 As BellSouth pointed out in its
application, "the [South Carolina Public Service Commission] has
been 'doing the hard job of promoting competition in [its] jurisdiction' and thus is intimately familiar with the activities of BellSouth and
new entrants alike."2 23 Although the FCC certainly considered the
state commission's findings, it apparently did not give them significant weight. Instead, the FCC's order once again contained several
decisions directly contrary to those the state commission offered in its
compliance order.2 24 The FCC rendered its own decisions despite acknowledging that the South Carolina Public Service Commission

220 CollaborativeApproach; supra note 17; infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
221 It may be instructive to note that the commissioners' statements cited above, see
supra note 219, fell well short of advocating either a less active role for the FCC or the
immediate approval of a BOG application. Instead, they seemed intent on maintaining
significant barriers to BOG entry, but conceded that the FCC should and will be available
to provide more guidance to the BOCs prior to the filing of an application. See, e.g., 13
FC.C.R.at 683-84 (BellSouth SC Order) (separate statement of Commissioner Michael L
Powell) (pointing out that "BellSouth's application is deficient in certain important areas,"
but stating that the Commission "could do much more to help develop and implement a
workable, collaborative framework for promoting compliance with section 271").
222 See generally Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing that state commissions are in the best position to assess local competition issues), affid
in part and rev'd in part sub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999).
223 BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 11 (quoting former FCC Chairman
Reed E. Hundt, Speech to Commission Staff (May 27, 1997), available in Reed E. Hundt,
Speech to Commission Staff. Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (visited Apr. 15, 1999) <http://
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh.726.hml>) (second alteration in original).
224 Compare 13 FC.C.R. at 585 (BellSouth SC Order) ("[W]e find that BellSouth does
not generally offer[ ] ... to provide certain of the checklist items." (internal quotation
marks omitted) (first alteration in original)), with BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., Order No.
97-640, No. 97-101-C, at 6 (Pub. Serv. Comm'n S.C. July 31, 1997) (SCPSC Compliance
Order) ("[BellSouth has] demonstrated that it is functionally able to provide these [checklist] items in South Carolina when ordered by a [competing provider].").
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(SCPSC) held extensive public hearings, which included testimony,
225
cross-examination, and over 1500 pages of pleadings.
b. Finding BellSouth in Noncompliance with Track B
Requirements
BellSouth filed its application under the theory that it complied
with § 271 (c) (1) (B)-Track B. 2 26 Track B allows an applicant to continue the § 271 process even though it does not yet face a facilitiesbased competitor in its local market. 227 BellSouth noted, and the FCC

agreed, that Congress enacted this provision to prevent potential competitors from "gaming" the system. 228 That is, a competitor should
not be able to delay a BOC's entry into the long-distance market
merely by refusing to compete with the BOC in its local exchange
market. Gaming represents a very real concern, and BellSouth legitimately argued that, without Track B, "companies such as AT&T, MCI,
and Sprint would have a strong incentive to continue delaying facilities-based local entry so as to protect their own shares of the [long''229
distance] market against Bell company competition.
To follow Track B, BellSouth filed a statement of the terms and
conditions it generally offers to any potential competitor, 230 and the
state commission approved this statement. 23 ' Nonetheless, the FCC
found that BellSouth failed to comply with Track B because the BOC
had received "qualifying requests." 232 As the FCC originally articulated in the SBC Oklahoma Order,a request is qualifying when potential
competitors expressly seek to negotiate binding interconnection
225 See 13 F.C.C.R. at 555 & n.53 (BellSouth SC Order); see also BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 2-3 ("Acting as the trier of fact, the SCPSC adduced evidence, evalu-

ated the credibility of witnesses who were exposed to cross examination under oath, and
reached conclusions on a record containing over 1600 pages of live and prepared sworn
testimony and another 1500 pages of pleadings.").
226 See BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 4-15. BellSouth also argued that it
complied with Track A, however, this argument was half-hearted. See id. at 15-17 (proposing that information held by competitors might indicate that BellSouth could proceed
under Track A).
227 See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (1) (B) (Supp. I 1996); supra notes 107-08 and accompanying
text.
228 See 13 F.C.C.1. at 566 (BellSouth SC Order) (describing the purpose of Track B as
that of preventing potential competitors' ability to delay indefinitely BOC entry into the
long-distance market by simply not seeking to compete with the BOC in its local market);
BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 8 (claiming that "It]he House Commerce Committee ...drafted Track B 'to ensure that a BOC is not effectively prevented from seeking
entry into the long distance market [simply] because no facilities-based carrier which
meets the criteria specified in the Act sought to enter the market'" (quoting H.RL REP. No.
104-204, at 77 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA4.N. 10, 43)).
229 BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 9.
230 See47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B).
231 See BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 7.
232 13 F.C.C.R. at 571, 574-77 (BellSouth SC Order).
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agreements with a BOC.2 33 The statutory question, therefore, is at

what point the FCC should deem a request "qualifying." BellSouth
took the position "that a request can preclude an application under
Track B only if the requester ... has made a request ... [and] is
'taking reasonable steps toward implementing its request in a fashion
that will"' lead to facilities-based local competition. 234 The FCC demurred: "Rather, we find that a request can be qualifying by its terms
and need not be accompanied by reasonable steps." 23 5 This interpretation departed from the standard the Commission applied in the SBC
Oklahoma OrdeY23 6 in which it appeared to accept a reasonable-steps
approach.2 3 7 Instead, the FCC concluded that there could exist only
two situations in which the BOG has received a request for intercofnnection but still may proceed under Track B: the requesting party
must either (1) breach an already negotiated agreement or (2) fail to
negotiate in good faith. 23 8 This standard, which arguably undermines
Congress's efforts to quash incentives to game the Act, puts a considerably greater onus on any BOC seeking to proceed under Track B.
c.

FindingBellSouth in Noncompliance with the Competitive
Checklist

As with the Ameritech Michigan Order, the majority of the FCC's
BellSouth South Carolina Order addresses concerns over the BOG's compliance with the competitive checklist. 23 9 Specifically, the FCC questioned whether BellSouth had provided competitors with
nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.24 ° The FCC adhered to its view

that a competitor's reputation may suffer because of customer service
problems that are the fault of the incumbent BOG's OSS.241 The

Commission ruled that the BOG's OSS must provide potential comSee SBC Communications Inc., 12 F.C.C.R 8685, 8716-17 (1997).
BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 10 (quoting SBC CommunicationsInc., 12
F.C.C.R_ at 8718-19).
235
13 F.C.C.R. at 573 (BellSouth SC Order).
236
See id. at 574 (stating that "[ulpon further reflection, we observe that there may be
other more efficient ways of assessing requests ... for purposes of Track B" than the reasonable-steps approach).
237 See SBC Communications Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. at 8716 (rejecting the notion "that any
request from a potential competitor forecloses Track B").
233
234

238

See i&.

239 See supranotes 162-64 and accompanying text (pointing out that a bulk of the Ameritech Michigan Orderfocused on the competitive checklist).
240 See 13 F.C.C.R. at 585 (BellSouth SC Order) ("A competing carrier that lacks access
to operations support systems equivalent to those the incumbent [local carrier] provides to
itself, its affiliates or its customers, 'will be severely disadvantaged, if not precluded altogether, from fairly competing.'" (quoting Local Competition Provisions in Telecomm. Act
of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,764 (1996))). For a brief explanation of what comprises
OSS, see supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
241 See 13 F.C.C.R. at 588 (BellSouth SC Order).
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petitors with a service level identical to that which the BOC receives,
or competitors cannot truly compete with the incumbent BOG.
The discussion of BellSouth's OSS largely paralleled the Ameritech
Michigan Order. The FCC found that BellSouth's pre-ordering and ordering OSS did not provide the same degree of access and accuracy to
its competitors that BellSouth itself enjoyed.2 42 Many of these
problems existed because BellSouth's OSS were not yet integrated for
competitors.2 43 Because BellSouth, at the time of its application, recognized that problems did exist, it proposed several methods by which
2 44
a competitor could overcome them, all of which the FCC rejected.
To illustrate the sequence of events, consider one problem competitors identified: they had difficulty transferring customer information
from their systems to those of the BOG because of integration
problems with the BOG's OSS. Upon notice of the difficulty, BellSouth proposed, as one alternative, that competitors cut and paste information from one interface to the other until their systems worked
seamlessly with BellSouth's-a project BellSouth was working on. The
FCC found this option unsatisfactory, stating that it forced "new entrants [to] take an extra step between the pre-ordering and ordering
processes that BellSouth does not face in the case of its own retail
operation, thereby increasing the likelihood of errors and delay for
new entrants but not for BellSouth's retail operation." 245 The FCC
reasoned that this cut-and-paste delay might cause the new entrant "a
24 6
significant competitive disadvantage."
The FCC also extensively addressed one non-OSS-related checklist requirement. The fourteenth checklist requirement stipulates that
a BOG must make its telecommunications services available for resale.2 4 7 BellSouth claimed that this provision does not cover special

Contract Service Arrangements (CSAs) 248 CSAs are specially negotiated agreements that give high-volume customers significant discounts. 249 BellSouth argued that the resale requirement should not
apply to CSAs if it would have an unreasonable or discriminatory effect. 250 The FCC's requiring BellSouth to provide these heavily dis-

counted services to a competitor at an even lower rate severely would
242

See, e.g., id. at 598 ("Evidence in the record suggests that, for example, AT&T and

MCI must submit orders an average of 1.7 times before acceptance by BellSouth's systems,
adding significant delay to the ordering process.").
243
See id. at 602.
244
See id. at 620-29.
245
Id. at 620.
246

Id. at 621.

247
248

See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2) (B) (xiv) (Supp. II 1996).
See BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 53.

249
250

See id.
See id, at 52.
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hamper its ability to compete for these contracts.2 51 The FCC rejected
BellSouth's contentions and found the BOG in noncompliance with
the resale provision.2 52 The FCC pointed out that it previously had
required CSAs to be available for resale in the same manner as all
other telecommunications services.253 By failing to comply, the FCC
25 4
stated, BellSouth impermissibly impaired competition.
4. BellSouth's LouisianaApplication
BellSouth's Louisiana Application coincided with its South Carolina application.2 55 In fact, BellSouth filed this application before the
FCC even issued its BellSouth South Carolina Order. The FCC immediately recognized that the two applications did not differ materially;
therefore, the Louisiana application and the resulting order add little
to the foregoing analysis. 25 6 The FCC rejected the findings of the
Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC), which had examined a
6200-page record with 3800 pages of testimony. 257 The FCC also
found that the same OSS issues existed. 258 Because BellSouth's systems were identical throughout its entire region, a presumption of
noncompliance resulted from the findings in the BellSouth South Caro251 See 13 F.C.C.RL at 659 (BellSouth SC Order) (noting BellSouth's argument that
CSA prices were already discounted from the tariff rate).
252 See id. at 658-63 ("We find that BellSouth fails to comply with item fourteen of the
competitive checklist by refusing to offer CSAs at a wholesale discount.").
253 See id. at 657.
254 See id. at 662 ("BellSouth's CSA restriction may have significant competitive
effects.").
255 In fact, BellSouth filed this application before the FCC even issued its BellSouth
South CarolinaOrder. BellSouth filed its Louisiana application on November 6, 1997. See
BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91. The FCC issued its determination of BellSouth's South Carolina application on December 24, 1997. See BellSouth Corp., 13
F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (BellSouth SC Order).
256 See BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 6245 (1998)- (BellSouth Louisiana Order) ("In
many respects, the instant application is materially indistinguishable from BellSouth's application to provide interLATA services in South Carolina.").
257 See id. at 6251-52 & n.31. As BellSouth noted, the Louisiana commission considered a multitude of factors, "adduced evidence, evaluated the credibility of witnesses who
were exposed to cross examination under oath, and reached conclusions on a nearly 6,200page record that included over 3,800 pages of testimony." BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 3. In fact, after receiving this evidence, "[t]he Louisiana Commission broadened the scope of the [proceeding] to encompass specific consideration of
BellSouth's [application]." 13 F.C.C.R. at 6251-52 (BellSouth Louisiana Order). BellSouth further argued that "[the FCC] must not countenance efforts to end-run the investigations of state commissions that are most familiar with the facts and best positioned to
determine local competition issues. It should, instead, accord the findings of the Louisiana PSC the deference to which they are properly entitled under section 271." BellSouth
Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 5.
258 See 13 F.C.C.R. at 6258 (BellSouth Louisiana Order).
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lina Order2 5 9 Finally, the FCC again noted that BellSouth treated
CSAs in contravention of the FCC's prior determinations regarding
260
resale of services.
BellSouth did raise one novel argument in its Louisiana application. It asserted that it satisfied the Track A requirements because it
faced competition from PCS providers in Louisiana. 26 1 BellSouth had
negotiated interconnection agreements with three wireless service
providers. 2 62 These agreements forced the FCC to consider whether
wireless service companies qualified under Track A's requirements as
"competing providers of telephone exchange service." 2 63 The Commission previously had held that PCS services are telephone exchange
services; 264 BellSouth also argued that while Congress expressly excluded cellular services from Track A's purview, it conspicuously did
not exclude PCS services.2 65 The FCC elected not to address this issue
in detail, finding instead that BellSouth did not satisfy the competitive
checklist requirements. 26 6 The order ends by noting that the FCC
considered PCS providers still to be in transition from providing a
complementary service to providing a competitively equivalent
267
service.
5.

Summary of the FirstFour Section 271 Applications

As is readily apparent from the above analysis, both the FCC and
the BOCs must cope with an extensive and cumbersome statutory
scheme. Certain issues dominate each application and order. On the
technical side, the FCC seems intent primarily on requiring the BOCs
259
See id. ("We use the determinations we made about BellSouth's operations support
systems in our BellSouth South Carolina Orderas a starting point."); supra notes 239-46 and
accompanying text.
260
See 13 F.C.C.R. at 6281-84 (BellSouth Louisiana Order).
261
See BellSouth LouisianaApplication, supranote 91, at 5 ("BellSouth ...is eligible to
apply for interLATA relief under Track A based on its interconnection agreements with
several wireless carriers.").
262
See id. at 9.
263
47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1) (A) (Supp. II 1996); see BellSouth Louisiana Application,
supra note 91, at 10.
264
See Local Competition Provisions in Telecomm. Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.tR 15,499,
15,999-16,000 (1996).
265 See BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 10-12. Section 271 (c) (1) (A)
states that "services provided pursuant to subpart K of part 22 of the Commission's regulations . . . shall not be considered to be telephone exchange services." 47 U.S.C.
§ 271(c) (1) (A). While the FCC's rules governing cellular services are contained in part 22,
the Commission has placed the PCS rules in part 24. See 13 F.C.C.R. at 6289-90 (BellSouth
Louisiana Order).
266 See 13 F.C.C.R. at 6289 (BellSouth Louisiana Order) ("Given our conclusion that
BellSouth does not meet the competitive checklist, we need not and do not decide in this
Order whether, for purposes of section 271(c) (1) (A), the PCS carriers listed above are
.competing providers of telephone exchange service' in the State of Louisiana.").
267
See id. at 6290.
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to improve considerably their OSS. The Commission has interpreted
the 1996 Act to require the BOCs to provide virtually identical OSS to
their local-service competitors. Despite the complexity of the systems
involved, the FCC has exhibited little tolerance for errors. To say that
the FCC has assumed a stubbornly inflexible stance would be a considerable understatement.
A significant nontechnical issue appears to be the interaction between the FCC and the state commissions.2 68 It is difficult to assess
precisely what weight the FCC has given the state commissions' recommendations. What does seem clear is that the FCC approaches state
commissions' findings with a strong dose of skepticism, which has led
it to reject the state commissions' support for SBC's and BellSouth's
entries into the Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Louisiana long-distance markets.
Both disputes, and particularly the controversy over the 1996
Act's assignment of responsibilities between the FCC and state commissions, seem well suited for resolution under the new collaborative
approach the FCC promised.2 69 Nonetheless, the FCC must go further in adopting a new § 271 approach to address criticisms such as
Judge Kendall's in SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC: "[P]erhaps most
significantly, it is conceivable that [the § 271] requirements may never
be met by the BOCs. Not only is the 'Competitive checklist' in § 271
extremely onerous, the process for applying to have the numerous
restrictions removed is tainted with indefiniteness and replete with arbitrary standards." 2 70 It is conceivable that the FCC does not feel the
need to rid itself or the process of this sort of castigation. If it does
wish to answer its many critics, however, adopting a less stringent approach to its application reviews would go a long way toward achieving
this goal.

268 Chairman Kennard recognized as much in a speech to state utility commissioners
in November 1997. During that speech he stated: "The goal of assuring competition...
will only be achieved if the FCC and the states work together... [T] he FCC and the states
[must find] common ground to achieve these goals. I intend to continue to work closely
with the States to forge common solutions that deliver choice.., for American consumers." William Kennard, Statement on the Filingof Petitionfor Writ of Crtiorari,Nov. 19, 1997,
available in 1997 FCC LEXIS 6388.

269 See CollaborativeApproach, supra note 17, at *8 ("[We must also] defer[ ] to [the
State Commissions' and the Justice Department's] judgments, according to the unique
strengths and perspectives they each bring to the local market-opening process.").
270

SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1007 (N.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd;

154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
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III
ENCOURAGING THE

SECrION

FCC To

RELAX ITS SCRUTIN

OF

271 APPLICATIONS: THE STATUTORY

ScHEME AND TECHNOLOGICAL

LANDSCAPE

The FCC need not take such a detailed approach to the § 271
application process. The 1996 Act contains sufficiently vague language2 71 and a broad mandate, which the FCC could use to justify
several approaches to its review of BOC applications. 272 In addition,
the FCC's proposed collaborative approach is not necessarily the answer. Although this strategy addresses several problems stemming
from the current, overly stringent approach, a collaborative effort still
requires too much FCC intervention. Moreover, it is improbable that
the proposed collaborative effort in fact will lead to an approved application materially faster than the FCC's current policy. 273 As an alternative to both the current and proffered policies, the FCC should
take a minimalist approach.
Under a minimalist approach, the FCC would exercise forbearance and its powers of oversight. The focus would be on allowing
market forces, as opposed to regulatory actions, to guide the telecommunications industry. 2 74 The FCC would still have to review § 271
applications for statutory compliance; however, it would perform this
duty in a considerably more flexible manner. 275 It would not, for ex271
See, e.g., supratext accompanying notes 136-43 (highlighting instances in which the
FCC had to decide the proper interpretation to give to certain statutory provisions).
272
See DUESTERBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 74-75 (arguing that "Congress was
unduly vague in giving the FCC its mandate and that this vagueness left the commission
ample room for.., expansive interpretation").
273 Commissioner Powell himself, an original advocate of the collaborative approach,
stated:
I am not calling for a process that will make it easy for BOCs to get into
long distance, without first having to comply fully with the local market
opening measures set out by Congress and this Commission. What I am
calling for is a process that will clearly place in the hands of the BOCs the
seeds of their own success, which will ultimately bear fruit for the American
consumer.

CollaborativeApproach, supra note 17, at *2-3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
274 See DUESTERBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 23. Duesterberg and Gordon note:
Moving immediately to reliance on market forces, rather than on traditional regulatory direction, is necessary if a truly efficient interconnected
network is to evolve, new investment is to take place at the proper rate (and
by those best able to do it), and customers are to receive the flil benefits of
the dynamic new technologies.
Id.
275 There are some commentators who advocate a substantial or complete reduction
of the FCC's regulatory role. See, e.g., id. at 92-95 (arguing for sunsetting the FCC's regulatory power); Chen, supra note 22, at 870 (advocating "immediate, unfettered (BOC] entry
into [long-distance] carriage"). This Note argues that these approaches go too far. By
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ample, reject an application because of a telemarketing script. 2 7 6 Nor
would it demand that incumbent BOCs provide flawless OSS to new
entrants in the local markets.

277

Instead of reviewing an application

with a single-minded focus on past monopolistic evils, the FCC would
place more emphasis on moving as rapidly as possible to a fully com2 78
petitive marketplace.
This Part describes how legal and economic conditions favor this
more minimalist, deregulatory solution. It argues that the current
statutory scheme and technological landscape adequately protect the
industry from the monopolistic conduct the opponents of BOCs' entry into the long-distance market fear.2 79 The FCC, therefore, has little reason to persist with the overly burdensome approach it has
insisted upon thus far.
A.

Statutory Safeguards

The most significant statutory safeguard in the 1996 Act is § 272.
This section takes effect once the FCC grants a BOC permission to
provide long-distance service. 280 It requires the BOG to provide long281 It
distance and local exchange services through separate affiliates.
also subjects the BOG to various requirements relating to corporate
structure, to reporting, and to auditing.2 8 2 In sum, § 272 enacts safeguards designed to ensure that the BOG does not engage in anticompetitive conduct.28 3 Section 272 directly responds to concerns that a

BOG providing long-distance service might engage in both cost misal28 4
location and improper discrimination.
carving out a role for the FCC, a minimalist approach offers the benefits of rapid deregulation while retaining the accumulated agency expertise that Congress intended to rely on.
276 See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
277 See, e.g., supra notes 177-83.
278
Cf DuETRBERG & GORDON, supranote 3, at 76 ("[W]hen given a choice between
actively intervening and simply maintaining general oversight, all too frequently the FCC
interprets its mandate as requiring the substitution of its own judgment for that of the
market or of state regulators.").
279 See id. at 24 ("Recent technological, regulatory, and market developments have
made clear that monopolized local-exchange access ... can be dealt with by allowing competition to develop at the local level."); see alsoAmeritech Michigan Application, supra note
91, at 3 ("[M]arket, statutory, regulatory, and technological constraints provide ample protection against any residual competitive concerns-typically voiced most vociferously by
those whose entrenched market position would be challenged by additional long distance
competition.").
280 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
281 See 47 U.S.C. § 272(a) (Supp. II 1996).
282 See id. § 272(b)-(d).
283 See Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 58 ("Section 272 of the 1996
Act prescribes safeguards that, in combination with pre-existing statutory and regulatory
requirements, dispel any concern that Ameritech could engage in improper discrimination, cross-subsidization or any other form of anticompetitive conduct.").
284 See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of
the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,216, 36,217 (1997) ("Con-
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The FCC addressed the problem of cost misallocation, or crosssubsidization, well before the 1996 Act and § 272 went into effect. By
substituting price caps for the previous cost-based regulation, the FCC
2 85
Cost mislargely removed incentives for a BOC to misallocate costs.

allocation occurs when the BOC realizes some advantage from shifting costs to its local services that it more properly should attribute to
its long-distance services. 28 6 Under the earlier system of cost-based
regulation, the regulating agencies tied the BOG's allowable rate of
return to its reported costs. 287 The BOC could earn more revenue by

reporting higher costs, thereby avoiding net losses after an increase in
expenses and having an incentive for cross-subsidization. Because
under a price-cap regime the BOC's allowable rate of return is not
directly tied to its reported costs, shifting costs will not produce higher
ceiling prices. 28 8 As a result, an increase in expenses will produce a
net loss, which removes a substantial incentive to misallocate costs.
Section 272 further ensures that BOCs will not allocate costs improperly by mandating specific reporting and accounting requirements. It requires the BOC to disclose all transactions with its longdistance affiliate. 289 The BOC also is subject to biennial compliance
audits. 2 90 By taking these additional steps, Congress sharply reduced
29 1
any remaining opportunities for cost-shifting.
gress ... enacted section 272 to respond to the concerns about anticompetitive discrimination and cost-shifting that arise when a BOG enters the interLATA services market in an inregion state in which the local exchange market is not yet fully competitive.").
285
See Declaration of Professor Jerry A. Hausman at 27-28, BellSouth Corp., 13
F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (No. 97-208) [hereinafter BellSouth Hausman Affidavit] ("Almost all
economists agree that 'pure' price caps remove cost misallocation problems. Since the
regulatory cost basis does not affect prices under price cap regulation, cost allocations do
not matter."); see also supra text accompanying notes 68-71 (describing the shift to price-cap
regulation).
286
See SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at 75.
287
See supranotes 50-52 and accompanying text (describing cost-based regulation).
288
See BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 86 ("There is no 'reward for shifting
costs from unregulated activities into regulated ones, for the higher costs will not produce
higher legal ceiling prices.'" (citing National Rural Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174,
178 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). AsJerry Hausman pointed out, some economists question the effectiveness of price-cap regulation because it is not "pure." BellSouth Hausman Affidavit,
supra note 285, at 27-28. However, as Hausman further explains, "most economists recognize that the price cap plans do substantially decrease any incentives for a BOG to cross
subsidize or misallocate costs." Id. at 28.
289
Section 272(b) (5) requires that the long-distance affiliates and BOCs shall conduct
all transactions "on an arm's length basis with any such transactions reduced to writing and
available for public inspection." 47 U.S.C. § 272(b) (5) (Supp. II 1996).
290
See id. § 272(d).
291
See BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 104 ("In section 272 of the
1996 Act, Congress sharply reduced opportunities for cost-shifting by requiring that a Bell
company provide long distance through an affiliate that has separate facilities, employees,
and record-keeping from the local telephone company. Moreover, Congress reinforced
structural separation with demanding accounting requirements." (citation omitted)).
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Some commentators argue that BOCs still have both the incentive and the ability improperly to allocate costs. 2 9 2 They argue that
regulators will be unable to detect these misallocations. 293 This argument has become much less tenable because of both the FCC's accumulated experience in monitoring the BOCs and the increased
effectiveness of independent audits. 294 In addition, the long-distance
providers now have over a decade of experience scrutinizing BOCs'
actions and have a strong incentive to police the BOCs' activities for
possible cost misallocations. 295 Taken in the aggregate, these factors
indicate that cost misallocation is a remote possibility and should not
296
substantially concern the FCC.
Section 272 also flatly forbids all types of discrimination that
BOCs might attempt to use to gain an unfair competitive advantage. 297 Discrimination refers to conduct in which the BOC favors for

access to its local network its long-distance affiliate over long-distance
competitors. 298 Price discrimination, for example, would result if a
BOC charged a long-distance competitor a higher rate to terminate
calls than what it charged its own long-distance affiliate. While price
discrimination may have warranted significant concern in the past,
even the FCC recognizes the minimal threat it poses today.2 99 Section
272(e) (3) expressly requires a BOC to charge its long-distance affiliate, or to impute to itself, "an amount for access to its telephone exchange service and exchange access that is no less than the amount
292
See, e.g., Affidavit of Robert H. Bork on Behalf of AT&T Corp. at 11, 15 n.1, BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (No. 97-208) [hereinafter AT&T Bork Affidavit] (ar-

guing that BOCs can still gain a competitive advantage by misallocating costs); Sullivan,
supranote 53, at 520 ("[T]he cold fact is that price caps and other weaker incentive systems
do not significantly reduce cross-subsidy incentives .... .").
293 SeeAT&T Bork Affidavit, supra note 292, at 11-12 (hypothesizing that improper cost
allocations by a BOG would be "particularly hard to detect"); Sullivan, supra note 53, at 520
(claiming that refinements in regulatory practices and auditing do not solve the problem
of cross-subsidies).
294
SeeJim Chen, Titanic Telecommunications, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 535, 555-56 (1996).
295 See Chen, supra note 22, at 871 ("After twelve years of patrolling [local exchange]
prices charged by GTE and the [BOGs], regulators and incumbent [long-distance carriers]
alike have a benchmark by which to detect potential predation.").
296 See SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at 73-76; BellSouth SC Application,
supra note 91, at 86-89.
297 See 47 U.S.C. § 272(c) (1) (Supp. II 1996) ("In its dealings with its affiliate[,] ...a
Bell operating company may not discriminate between that company or affiliate and any
other entity in the provision or procurement of goods, services, facilities, and information,
or in the establishment of standards... ."); Affidavit of RichardJ. Gilbert at 31, BellSouth
Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (No. 97-208) [hereinafter BellSouth Gilbert Affidavit] (citing § 272(c) (1)-(2), (e) (2) (A), and (e)(3) as "safeguards of the 1996 Act [designed to]
ensure that BOG entry [into the long-distance market] will not result in discrimination").
298 See supranotes 54-57 and accompanying text.
299 See Pacific Telesis Group, 12 F.C.C.R. 2624, 2648 (1997) (finding that price discrimination "is relatively easy for [the FCC] and others to detect, and is therefore unlikely to
occur").
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charged to [its competitors]."300 The clear intent of this section, coupled with sophisticated policing by both the FCC and BOC's competitors, works to thwart a BOC's possible efforts to violate the mandate
against price discrimination.
In contrast, technical discrimination is more subtle and troubling. As the FCC stated in its Ameritech Michigan Order.
"[A] BOG may have an incentive to discriminate in providing exchange access services and facilities that its affiliate's rivals need to
compete in the interLATA telecommunications services... markets.
For example, a BOG may have an incentive to degrade services and
facilities furnished to its affiliate's rivals, in order to deprive those
rivals of efficiencies that its affiliate enjoys."30 1
Section 272 recognizes this concern and flatly forbids such conduct.30 2 The statute backs up this prohibition by requiring regular

compliance audits.3 0 3 Still, many observers question the efficacy of
the statutory proscriptions and audits.3 0 4 These apprehensions have
some merit; however, they fail to recognize the unlikelihood that a
discrimination scheme would succeed to the extent necessary truly to
achieve an anticompetitive effect.3 0 5 A BOC's activity must withstand
not only the FCC's and state commissions' scrutiny, but also monitoring by long-distance providers, which have vendor management programs to detect discriminatory conduct. 30 6 The combination of
overlapping statutory and market safeguards more than adequately
protects against any significant form of discrimination.
One additional statutory safeguard warrants brief discussion:
§271(d) (6). This section gives the FCC the power, after it has approved a § 271 application, to "correct [any] deficiency," "impose ...
penalt[ies]," and "suspend or revoke" the BOG's approval to provide
47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(3).
Ameritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 20,724 (1997) (quoting Non-Accounting
Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of Communications Act of 1934, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,905,
21,912 (1996)).
302
See 47 U.S.C. § 272(c) (1).
303
See id. § 272(d).
304
See, e.g., AT&T Bork Affidavit, supranote 292, at 6 (arguing that the level of technological complexity inherent in the BOGs' networks would allow a BOG to exercise discriminatory discretion, which "would be largely beyond the ability of regulators to control").
305
See BellSouth Hausman Affidavit, supra note 285, at 30-31 ("The key insight here is
that for possible discrimination to distort competition, the discrimination must be visible
to the customer, but not visible to the competitor.").
306
See BellSouth Gilbert Affidavit, supra note 297, at 35-36. As Professor Gilbert stated:
[T]o have an anti-competitive effect, the degradation in service would have
to be significant enough for customers to notice it. These vendor management programs make it likely that [a long-distance carrier] would detect
any degradation in BellSouth's access service long before any customer
could notice that degradation and attribute it to the [long-distance carrier].
300

301
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long-distance service.A0 7 The FCC has ninety days to act on any complaint asserting that the BOG is violating conditions its § 271 approval
required. 08 By compelling a quick FCC response, the statute effectively guarantees that a BOG could not gain even a short-term advantage by violating its statutory duties.A0 9 Furthermore, the FCC already
has indicated that it intends to interpret its § 271 (d) (6) power
broadly.3 1 0 The FCC's willingness to use this section to impose sanctions and the drasti effect these sanctions can have on a BOG's business afford yet another reason why the FCC need not apply such
stringent standards to § 271 applications.
B.

Technological and Other Economic Safeguards

Aside from the numerous statutory provisions Congress designed
to prevent anticompetitive conduct, current technological constraints
and market conditions in the telecommunications industry make it
increasingly difficult for a BOG to hinder the development of competition. 11 The technological complexity and automation of the BOGs'
systems make it increasingly difficult for a BOG to circumvent its systems to discriminate against competitors.3 12 As BellSouth pointed out
in both its South Carolina and Louisiana applications, a BOG's adversely affecting a competitor's network services in a way that would
not be readily detectable would require an exceptional effort. 31 3
Current market conditions impose even greater constraints on a
BOG's ability negatively to impact competition in either the local or
long-distance market. First, the major long-distance providers are
314
powerful foes that will cling tenaciously to their market shares.
307 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) (6) (A).
308 See id. § 271(d) (6) (B).
309 See Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 92-93 ("[T]he Commission
must act upon any complaints about a BOG's behavior within 90 days, ensuring that a BOG
cannot reap even short-term rewards for any anticompetitive behavior.").
310 SeeAmeritech Mich., 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 20,750 (1997) (pointing out that the FCC
interprets § 271(d) (6) as granting the Commission broad authority to remedy any perceived BOG violations).
311
SeeAmeritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at iv ("The statutory and regulatory safeguards established under the 1996 Act, as well as economic and technological
constraints, make it virtually impossible for [a BOG] to use its position to obstruct competition in the provision of either local or long distance services."); DuEs-RBERG & GORDON,
supra note 3, at 24 ("Recent technological, regulatory, and market developments have
made clear that monopolized local-exchange access.., can be dealt with by allowing competition to develop at the local level.").
312
See BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 108.
313
See id.; BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 91-92.
314 See SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at 78 ("Realistically ... any attempt
to drive out large and well-financed incumbent carriers who have made mammoth sunk
investments would be doomed. AT&T itself has conceded that there is little reason to fear
that [a Bell company] could monopolize the interexchange market by driving the major
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These competitors enjoy strong, nationwide brand names,3 15 and they

actively will protect their established markets while aggressively making inroads into the BOCs' lucrative business-customer base.3 16 Sec-

ond, to protect their interests and their customers, these competitors
will scrutinize the BOCs' performance for possible statutory violations.3 17 Finally, smaller access providers are beginning to apply noticeable competitive pressure on the BOCs' local exchange markets.
At the second anniversary of the 1996 Act, FCC Chairman William
Kennard boasted that the number of competitive local exchange carriers exceeded one hundred, and investment in these carriers
amounted to $14 billion.3 18

BOCs also face competition from rapidly developing technologies
such as cellular telephony and PCS.3 19 This competition will restrain

further the BOCs' ability successfully to inhibit competition in the local and long-distance markets.3 20 Additionally, cable companies are
3 21
poised to join the fray and begin marketing local telephone service.
incumbents out of business." (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
315 SeeBellSouth Gilbert Affidavit, supranote 297, at 13-14 ("The primary long distance
carriers have very strong brand name recognition.... An MTA-EMCI study found that the
AT&T brand was recognized nationwide by 97% of consumers, followed by 84% for MCI
and 75% for Sprint.").
316 See Chen, supra note 294, at 566 ("Any supracompetitive profits that [local carriers]
enjoy from their command of local markets are being whittled away... [by, among other
things,] cream-skimming competitors .... "); cf BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra
note 91, at 122 (pointing out that BellSouth's revenue base is highly concentrated and that
"[tihis geographic concentration of revenues means that the threat of competition imposes significant competitive constraints on BellSouth").
317
See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
318
See Chairman William E. Kennard, Press Statement on the Second Anniversary of the
Telecom Act of 1996,Jan. 30, 1998, available in 1998 FCC LEXIS 478, at *2.
319
See BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 16 ("Market surveys of PCS
service in Louisiana indicate that about 17 percent of [PCS customers in Louisiana] chose
to subscribe to PCS service instead of subscribing to wireline service.... Each of these study
results indicates that substitution between wireless and wireline calling is occurring." (citations omitted) (typeface altered)); SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at 88 ("Cellular subscribership has soared from near zero in the early 1980s to 34 million in early
1996.").
320
See ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK Is CHEAP 239-40 (1995)
(concluding that wireless systems can pose significant competition to BOCs' basic telephony service and that they "could discipline the telephone companies that attempt to raise
residential access rates for voice services").
321
See BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 121 ("[C]able television companies.., have facilities that could be utilized to offer telephone exchange service and are
likely to be a source of facilities-based competition in a matter of months." (emphasis omitted)). Cable companies are not only looking to enter the local telephony market by themselves but also through strategic mergers. The recent AT&T and TCI merger provides a
perfect example. AT&T's desire to take advantage of TCI's network to provide local telephone service largely drove this merger; the FCC readily recognized the substantial possibilities of mergers with cable companies:
We recognize that cable systems possess an important asset-a "second
wire" into most homes-that may have permitted TCI in the long term to
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In sum, the increasing proliferation of telecommunications alternatives will provide a natural check on any BOCs' attempts to garner an
3 22
unfair competitive advantage.
Largely in recognition of the increasingly competitive marketplace, BOCs recently have begun consolidating. The recent spate of
mergers-Bell Atlantic merged with NYNEX and is now seeking to
merge with GTE; SBC merged with PacTel and is now seeking to
merge with Ameritech-has sparked much debate. 323 What has
emerged from this debate is the recognition that the government
must allow BOCs to consolidate in order for them to remain competi3 24
tive as the telecommunications industry continues to evolve.
become a sustained and effective competitor for residential telecommunications customers. Here, however, the complementary nature of the merging firms' assets means that the combined firm will be able to provide an
alternative to the incumbent LECs' services for residential customers far
more quickly and effectively than either could separately. TCI possesses the
"last mile" assets, while AT&T possesses a brand name, experience, and financial resources that improve TCI's ability to capitalize on its network assets. We are committed to ensuring that residential local exchange
competition becomes a reality sooner rather then later. One way this may
occur more quickly is through combinations of complementary assets by
emerging entrants such as AT&T and TCI.
Tele-Communications, Inc., 14 F.C.C.R. No. 98-178 (Feb. 18, 1999) (footnote omitted),
available in Federal Communications Commission (visited May 1, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov>.
322 See Chen, supra note 22, at 871 ("The aggregate effect of emerging [local exchange] competition from [competitive accord providers], cable system operators, [longdistance carriers], and wireless carriers will likely keep incumbent [local carriers] busy defending their home turf, much less contemplating predatory raids on the [long-distance]
market."). But see Sullivan, supranote 53, at 507 (arguing that "no such [technological]
state of affairs is currently in place"). While Professor Sullivan is obviously correct that
traditional, wireline telephony still overwhelmingly dominates the market, he neglects the
broader point: BOCs are facing threats to competition from an increasing number of
sources, and the concern that they can stifle all competition in local markets is becoming
increasingly unfounded. Equally untenable is Professor Sullivan's assertion that "[w]e simply do not know whether further developments will break down the technological and
economic barriers adequately to cause an implosion of [competitive access providers],
cable, [long-distance] operations, or cellular technologies into [local exchange] markets
sufficiently to effectively constrain [BOG] monopoly power." Id. According to Professor
Chen, "[Sullivan] neglects to mention perhaps the most important dynamic affecting the
market for alternatives to the [BOCs'] wireline [local exchange] service: the ability of these
would-be competitors to combine, collude and combat incumbent [local carriers]." Chen,
supra note 294, at 557-58. Duesterberg and Gordon add that "[i t is... difficult to sustain
the argument that incumbent providers can abuse their position for any significant period
of time either to stifle competition or to extort unjustified rents from customers." DuFsTERBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 74.
323
See, e.g., James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters: The DualJurisdiction
of the FCC and the Justice Department over Telecommunications Transactions,6 CoMMLmw CONsPE crUs 195, 200 (1998) ("[W]ithin the merger context, [the FCC and the DOJ] have been
finding lately that they are targets of intensified political pressure. This pressure is rooted
primarily in a growing Congressional perception that anti-competitive mergers are passing
muster at the agencies without the imposition of adequate protections for consumers.").
324
See, e.g., Klein Perceives Most Telco Mergers as Lawful Reactions to Changing Technology,
75 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1885, at 543 (Nov. 12, 1998) (discussing comments made by Joel I. Klein, Chief of the DOJ Antitrust Division, that "'the vast majority' of
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Examples of the Efficacy of Existing Safeguards

Because the FCC has yet to approve a § 271 application, obviously
no actual examples indicate how effective the statutory safeguards will
prove to be. The brief history of the § 271 application process, however, provides numerous indicators that the statutory safeguards will
work as Congress intended. Throughout each § 271 proceeding, parties opposing BOCs' entry into the long-distance market have been
extremely quick to direct the FCC's attention to perceived statutory
shortcomings.3 25 As a result, BOCs frequently have adjusted their procedures to address these concerns. 3 26 The BOCs certainly have not
addressed all of their opponents' complaints, or even a majority of
them.3 27 Nonetheless, the experience shows that the major long-distance providers and other interested parties intensely scrutinize the
BOCs' actions, and that they will not hesitate to address before the
FCC or in the courts unfairness they perceive. 328 Nothing militates
thinking that this scrutiny will wane after the FCC permits a BOC to
compete in the long-distance service market.
It is equally apparent that market conditions will provide significant safeguards against anticompetitive conduct. For example, Southern New England Telephone Company (SNET) provides both local
current market consolidation activity is, in fact, not anti-competitive" and that
"[t]elecommunications companies are looking to the future, hoping that consolidation
with other companies gives synergistic advantages that will allow them to remain competitive in a global market undergoing rapid technological change and deregulation").
325
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T Corp. in Opposition to BellSouth's Section 271 Application for South Carolina at 8-19, BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (No. 97-208)
[hereinafter AT&T BellSouth SC Comments] (citing an abundance of perceived faults in
BellSouth's application).
326
See, e.g., BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 51 (stating that BellSouth is providing certain network alternatives to competitors as a result of AT&T's complaints during proceedings in front of the Louisiana Public Service Commission); Affidavit
of Warren L. Mickens on Behalf of Ameritech Michigan at 17-18, Ameritech Mich., 12
F.C.C.R. 20,543 (1997) (No. 97-137) ("Ameritech has recently agreed to provide 'mean
time to repair' information, in response to requests of its wholesale customers. .. .").
327
See, e.g., 13 F.C.C.R. at 608-09 (BellSouth SC Order) (explaining that the FCC specifically asked BellSouth to provide certain data with its § 271 application, which BellSouth
did not supply).
328 AT&T's introduction to its comments in reply to BellSouth's South Carolina application may best illustrate the competitors' resolve to contest all perceived BOC statutory
violations. In arguing that the FCC should give little weight to the South Carolina Commission's finding that BellSouth satisfied the § 271 checklist requirements, AT&T stated that
[t]he state commission's supposedly in-depth analysis of BellSouth's checklist offerings is nothing more than a verbatim, commission-stamped recirculation of BellSouth's proposed order, with factual misstatements, legal
errors, and even typos all intact.... The results of the Potemkin-proceedings below thus merit no deference because the South Carolina PSC exercised no independent judgment.
AT&T BellSouth SC Comments, supra note 325, at 1-2 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted).
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and long-distance services in the same geographical market. 329 A discussion of the significant benefits to consumers resulting from SNET's
competition with the Big Three long-distance providers are discussed
below. 3 30 It is instructive to note here that, to a large extent, compa-

nies like SNET have the same theoretical incentives and ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct as would the BOGs upon entry into
the long-distance market. 331 Yet throughout'the § 271 process thus
far, no party has cited examples of actions SNET has taken to impede
3 32
competition.
Further illustrations are also available. For example, BOGs currently may provide cellular service that arguably could foster anticompetitive conduct despite interconnection requirements similar to
those in the long-distance market.3 33 Indeed, competitors issued grim

predictions of the deleterious market effects that would stem from
BOGs' entry into the cellular business. 334 These predictions never
came to pass, and the wireless. industry remains intensely competitive.335 In the end, there exist numerous well-founded reasons to be-

lieve that the statutory scheme Congress enacted, coupled with the
evolution of technology and current market conditions, adequately
ensure against a monopoly in the telecommunications industry.
These factors will guarantee healthy and competitive markets even after the FCC grants BOCs permission to provide long-distance service.
Moreover, these safeguards militate in favor of the FCC's adopting a
33 6
minimalist approach to the § 271 application review process.

329 SNET is not bound by §§ 271-275 of the 1996 Act because AT&T was only a minority owner at the time of the divestiture, only rendering SNET not subject to the MFJ.
330
See infra notes 372-75 and accompanying text.
331 See BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 99-100 (discussing GTE's incentives
for anticompetitive conduct).
332 See id. at 99 (noting that AT&T "attributes SNET's success to lower prices").
333 See BellSouth Louisiana Application, supra note 91, at 118 ("[G]iven that cellular
carriers and [long-distance] carriers have similar local interconnection requirements, Bell
companies have had essentially the same incentive and ability to act anticompetitively
against rival cellular carriers as they would have to act anticompetitively against other
[long-distance] carriers in in-region states.").
334 See id- ("As with [long-distance] services, moreover, predictions of future harm to
the public interest preceded Bell company participation in the cellular business.").
335 See id ("Yet, this theoretical incentive of wireline carriers to inhibit cellular growth
has not created any actual problems.... Indeed, 'the wireless communications business is
one in which relatively small, entrepreneurial competitors have often been as successful as
...
the BOCs.'" (citing McCaw, 9 F.C.C.R. 5836, 5861-62 (1994)) (second alteration in
original)).
336 See DuESTERBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 74 ("Congress and the FCC have laid
the essential groundwork for competition, and the FCC ought now to let the process proceed on its own.").
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IV
THE

ADVANTAGES OF A MINIMALiST APPROACH:

FROM FASTER

BOC

BENEFrrs

ENTRY INTO THE LONG-

DISTANCE MARKET

The 1996 Act indisputably seeks to benefit consumers by opening
the telecommunications markets to competition.3 37 As FCC Chairman William Kennard stated in his Senate confirmation hearings:
"Competition is the cornerstone of the 1996 Act, and the FCC must
continue to promote competition in every sector of the communications marketplace .... ."3 8 Discussion of how the new chairman and
commissioners intended to accelerate the deregulatory process dominated those hearings.3 3 9 This pervading theme is not at all remarkable given the substantial benefits that everyone anticipates will
accompany widespread competition.
By easing the § 271 standards, the FCC more quickly can allow
the benefits of competition to take hold in the telecommunications
marketplace. This Part first addresses some commentators' concerns
about the perceived need for extensive competition in the local arena
prior to a BOC's entry into the long-distance market. These apprehensions are misplaced. As the latter half of this Part outlines, substantial advantages would accrue if the FCC allowed a BOC to provide
long-distance services sooner, rather than later. Achieving these consumer benefits as quickly as possible should be the FCC's overriding
goal.
A.

Common Criticisms of a Less Stringent Section 271 Review

One of the most pervasive arguments against the FCC's conducting more lenient reviews is that § 271 represents a type of incentive regulation. 340 Those supporting this proposition argue that
337 As stated in the oft-cited House Conference Report, the intent of the Act is "to
provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information
technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to
competition." H.1L CoNF.REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
124, 124.
338
Confirmation HearingBefore the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transp. Comm., 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of William E. Kennard), available in 1997 FCC LEXIS 5431, at *5.
339 See Slow Pace of Local Competition Prime Focus of Senate Panel'sFCC Confirmation Hearings, VIDEO COMPETITION REP., Oct. 9, 1997 (stating that the Senate confirmation hearings
focused intently on how the new Commissioners intended to speed the pace of local
competition).
340 One of the most prominent supporters of this argument is Professor Sullivan. He
has articulated his position by writing.
[E]ffective competition in [local exchange] markets, a basic goal of the new
Act, will only be achieved or will be achieved more rapidly, if [BOGS] have
an incentive fully and ungrudgingly to make the essential changes in their
marketing practices. Until the [BOGs] realize that the [long-distance] mar-
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Congress enacted § 271 so that "the FCC would use the incentive of
long-distance entry to draw the BOGs into cooperating with local exchange competitors." 341 According to this view, if the FCC allows a
BOG's entry into the long-distance market too quickly, then the BOC
will no longer have any substantial incentive to comply with many of
the 1996 Act's requirements.3 42 The BOG therefore will not cooperate with competitors' attempts to enter the local markets as the statute
requires.3 43 BOG opponents have dubbed this argument "the 'first
things first' rule,"3 44 and have referred to § 271 as providing a "carrot"
for the BOCs. 3 45 They also appear to take pleasure in consistently cit-

ing Senator Hollings's proclamation that "[t]elecommunications services should be deregulated after, not before, markets become
3 46
competitive."
The first-things-first argument, however, does not give enough
credit to the Act's express requirements or to the additional safeguards already in place.3 4 7 Predictions that BOCs will drag their feet

or cease compliance with their statutory obligations are based on the
assumption that BOCs will choose the dangerous game of overfly
breaching their duties-duties that the FCC and the BOCs' competitors closely monitor.348 It further assumes that the BOCs would get
ket will be open to them only after they have effectively participated in
breaking down their local bottleneck monopolies..., the [BOGs'] market
incentive will be to clutch tenaciously to local power so that they can profit
from it directly and also leverage it into long distance.
Sullivan, supranote 53, at 493; see also Finn, supra note 5, at 219 ("[1 t is almost universally
recognized that the reward of long-distance entry is the single most important regulatory
tool in ensuring that competition takes root in the local exchange market.").
341
Hundt Subcomm. Statement, supra note 7, at 17; see also Finn, supra note 5, at 218
("Congress enacted Section 271 to provide BOGs with an incentive to open local exchange
markets by rewarding them with the ability to provide in-region long-distance services.").
342
See Sullivan, supra note 53, at 490-93 (arguing that if BOGs are allowed to enter the
long-distance market before they face significant competition, it will be considerably more
difficult to open the local markets).
343
See AT&T BellSouth SC Comments, supra note 325, at 66-67 (claiming that, in the
context of the BellSouth's § 271 proceeding, the "only incentive to open local markets is
the prospect of long distance entry[, and] . . . [o]nce BellSouth is granted interLATA
authority, its sole incentive will be to further impede the development of local competition" (citation omitted)).
344 E.g., FCC Should Keep First Things Firstin Louisiana,Says MCI, PR NvswiRl, Nov. 6,
1997, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories File.
345
See, e.g., Comments of MCI Telecommunications Corporation at 99, BellSouth
Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997) (No. 97-208) ("[T]he 'carrot' of long distance entry will
continue to encourage BellSouth to open its local markets to competition.").
346
142 CONG. Rxc. S688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
347 For an example of current requirements, see BellSouth Woroch Affidavit, supra
note 213, at 22-23 ("The Act... mandates that [BOGs] interconnect their networks with
rivals and provide some form of collocation.").
348
See id. at 23 ("The new Telecom Act does not tolerate refusals to interconnect, and
is vigilant against more subtle strategies such as inferior interconnection or discriminatory
pricing of network elements.").
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away with the breach of their duties. However, the same market forces
that might compel BOCs to engage in activities that disadvantage their
competitors also will prompt their competitors to (1) battle the disadvantageous BOG policies, (2) use their own competitive advantages to
stifle BOGs' efforts to provide long-distance service, and (3) seek alternative ways of providing customers with local service. Therefore, it is
inaccurate to characterize the BOGs' future competitors as helpless
against any potential anticompetitive practices by the incumbent
BOCs.
Despite the oft-cited quote from Senator Hollings, there is ample
evidence that Congress is not as wed to the first-thing-first argument
as its proponents would suggest. The vague statutory language of
§ 271 certainly supports a variety of interpretations.3 49 More importantly, certain provisions indicate Congress's awareness that a BOC
might receive § 271 approval before facing significant competition in
its local market. A prime example is § 271(c) (1) (B)-the Track B
provision°3 5 0-which specifically allows the FCC to approve a BOC's
application despite a recognized lack of facilities-based
competition.

35 1

The first-things-first argument's prominence seems to come from
the understandable defensiveness of the main opponents to BOCs'
entry into the long-distance service market-the major long-distance
carriers. These carriers will grab at anything in their aggressive assault
on BOC applications. 3 52 While it is not improper for these companies
to make this argument-indeed it would be odd if they did not-the
FCC should not substitute its judgment with the judgment of those
who have everything to gain from keeping the BOCs out of the long3 53
distance market.
See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
For a description of the Track B provision, see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text and supra Part II.B.3(b).
351
See BellSouth Woroch Affidavit, supra note 213, at 6 ("Track B was created to grant
interLATA authority in states where no legitimate facility-based carriers had stepped forward-provided the [BOG] demonstrates that its local exchange markets are open to effident competitors." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also SBC Communications
Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, 8717 (1997) (recognizing that Congress enacted Track B to ensure
that a BOG is not foreclosed from providing long-distance service simply because no facilities-based competitor has chosen to make inroads into the BOG's local market).
352
Cf Chen, supra note 294, at 542 ("The opposing sides have dug intricate trenches
and 'worn deep grooves repeating the same basic arguments and counter arguments over
and over.'" (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Playof Intelligence,"36 WM. & MARY L.
Rzv. 147, 159 (1994))).
353 Compare Give the Telecom Act Time To Work, AT&T CEO Says, PR NvswiRE, Feb. 10,
1998, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories File ("We should not let [the Act's] benefits
to consumers and competition slip away because we got tired of removing the obstacles
created by the opponents of competition.... [Wie need the patience and perseverance to
put the Act to work in local markets." (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Commissioner Michael K. Powell, Section 271 Review. The Challenge of Charlie Brown, Remarks
349
350
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Other criticisms to the FCC's taking a less-detailed approach focus on the possibility that an approved BOG will engage in some form
of cost misallocation or discrimination. Part Hm of this Note addressed
this issue, noting that these arguments have become increasingly nonviable. In the end, all of the protestations to BOCs' entry into the
long-distance market prior to the existence of significant local competition seem to lose sight of the target of § 271's "reward": the consumers.3 54 While the FCC and its supporters continue to advocate a

stringent review of BOG applications, the consumers consequently

3 55
must wait longer for the promised benefits of the Act.

B.

Benefits of BOGs' Entry into the Long-Distance Market

One industry expert, Robert Crandall, estimated that the U.S.
economy could gain nearly $30 billion net a year if the telecommunications industry became fully deregulated. 35 6 Much of this anticipated windfall would come from an expected decline in long-distance
rates. According to Professor Paul W. MacAvoy, Michigan consumers,
for example, stood to realize a total benefit of nearly $450 million
annually if the FCC had granted Ameritech's application.3 5 7 In South
Carolina, one study estimated that long-distance rates would have
dropped by 25%, resulting in a benefit of approximately $1.2 billion
3 58
after five years, if the FCC had granted BellSouth's application.
Even without assessing the accuracy of these specific estimates, it
is indisputable that significant gains for long-distance consumers
would result from BOGs' entry into the long-distance market. Both
the FCC and the DOJ have conceded that competition within the
long-distance market is imperfect and would benefit from additional
Before the United States Telephone Association (Jan. 22, 1998), available in Michael K.
Powell, "Section 271 Review: The Challenge of CharlieBrown" (visited Jan. 15, 1999) <http://
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/PoweU/spmkp8Ol.html> ("The Act's goal of opening local telephone markets to competition is a lofty one, and... [w]e will all need to be patient as we
unravel [the regulatory] system.").
354
BellSouth Hausman Affidavit, supra note 285, at 6 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
355
See BellSouth Gilbert Affidavit, supra note 297, at 41 ("Any delay in granting [longdistance] authority because local competition is not sufficiently established... will deny
telecommunications consumers the benefit of increased choice and increased competition
in long distance .... ").
356
See Robert W. Crandall, Waves of the Future: Are We Ready To DeregulateTelecommunications?, BRoomNGs RFV., Winter 1996, at 26, 28-29.
357
SeeAffidavit of Paul W. MacAvoy in Support of the Application of Ameritech Michigan for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Michigan, at 2, Ameritech Mch., 12
F.C.C.R. 20,543 (1997) (No. 97-137) [hereinafter Ameritech MacAvoy Affidavit]. MacAvoy
calculated the estimated benefits that would flow to the entire Ameritech region were the
FCC to grant Ameritech permission to provide long-distance service throughout. He
placed the total benefit in the range of $1.9 to $2.1 billion annually. See id.
358 See BellSouth SC Application, supra. note 91, at 83 (citing WEFA group study in
support of its estimates).
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entrants. s 59 Though some commentators question whether the longdistance market in fact lacks vibrant competition,3 60 substantial evidence demonstrates that the market is far from perfectly competitive.3 61 MacAvoy makes this point by analyzing the major longdistance service providers' price-cost margins over a twelve-year period.3 62 In theory, price-cost margins should decrease as the competi3 63
tiveness in the industry increases because prices will approach costs.
Margins also should decrease as a market becomes less concentrated
because decreased concentration increases competition among more
competitors of similar size.3 64 MacAvoy's study, however, shows precisely the opposite of what theory suggests: the long-distance industry
has become less concentrated,3 65 yet price-cost margins show no corresponding decrease. In many instances, the margins actually have
increased.3 66 The data support an inference that the long-distance
market is not as competitive as the major carriers claim.3 6 7 AT&T and
359 See, e.g., SBC Communications Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, 8728 (1997) (separate statement of Chairman Reed E. Hundt). Former FCC Chairman Hundt first points out the
statement of the DOJ that " ' it is reasonable to conclude that additional entry, particularly,
by firms with the competitive assets of the [Bell Operating Companies], is likely to provide
additional competitive benefits.'" Id. (quoting Dep't ofJustice Evaluation (filed May 16,
1997)). Hundt then agrees by saying: "IT]he entry into the long distance market by SBC
or a carrier with similar assets would promote competition and benefit consumers. The
Commission has previously noted concern about evidence... suggest[ing] that there may
be tacit price coordination among AT&T, MCI and Sprint." Id.
360
See, e.g., Finn, supra note 5, at 227 (claiming that there will only be "incremental
public interest benefits from BOC entry into the already-competitive long-distance market"); Sullivan, supra note 53, at 510-17 (arguing that BOC entry into the long-distance
markets will not be as beneficial as many claim).
361
See generally MAcAVOY, supra note 56, at 105-74 (explaining how his exhaustive
study of trends in the long-distance markets over the past decade supports the conclusion
that significant competition in the provision of long-distance service has yet .to truly
materialize).
362
See Ameritech MacAvoy Affidavit, supra note 357, at 2. (defining price-cost margins
as "the percentage by which prices exceed the marginal costs of providing various
services").
363
See id.
364 See id. This concept is relatively simple and is obviously not limited to the telecommunications industry. Suppose, for example, that A and B each own a convenience store
that sells packages of nuts for the monopoly price of $3. Suppose further that each buys
these packages for $1. If the industry remains concentrated, as the cost of nuts increases to
$2, both will increase their prices to $4 to maintain the $3 monopoly profit-the price-cost
margin does not change. If C and D enter the convenience store market, however, each
will have to lower his prices to compete with the others as the market becomes less concentrated. In this scenario, D's nuts will sell for less than $4, thereby reflecting a smaller pricecost margin.
365
See MacAvoy, supra note 56, at 85-98. MacAvoy measures the concentration levels
for four different types of long-distance service. Data on each service show that concentration levels are decreasing. See id. at 85-89 & fig.4-1.
366
See id at 117-21. MacAvoy concludes that price-cost margins for AT&T, Sprint, and
MCI "across all four sets of markets... increased by substantial percentages each year." Id.
at 121.
367 See id at 171-74.
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the other major carriers attack MacAvoy's study and his conclusions as
"inconclusive"3 68 and "false,"3 69 to which MacAvoy responds in detail.37 0 Even if MacAvoy's study overstates the noncompetitiveness of

the long-distance market, his study, combined with common sense,
compels the conclusion that it will be more competitive upon BOCs'
37 1
entry.
The experience of SNET provides additional evidence that long3
distance consumers will benefit from BOCs' entry into the market.

72

In Connecticut, competition between SNET and AT&T led to the decline of long-distance rates.3 73 In its efforts to compete, SNET offered
an additional consumer benefit in the form of innovative billing practices. 3 74 While economists argue over the extent of competition in the

long-distance market, one confidently may conclude that upon entering the market, BOCs aggressively will lure customers away from the
current long-distance providers-a move that undoubtedly will spark
various forms of competition, all of which should benefit
3 75
consumers.
BOCs' entry into the long-distance market also may have the effect of stimulating competition in the local markets. Currently, major
long-distance providers have little incentive to proceed quickly in developing and implementing their local service plans. 37 6 On the one
368 AT&T Ameritech Comments, supra note 157, at 49 n.26 (alleging that the FCC
twice rejected MacAvoy's findings).
369 E.g., id. at 48.
370 See Ameritech MacAvoy Affidavit, supra note 357, at 25. As an example of the disagreements between the parties, one persistent criticism of MacAvoy's study is that his
price-cost margin analysis does not account for the significant discounts available to a large
number of long-disfance customers. MacAvoy responds to this by analyzing the margins
under some of the key discount plans and concluding that the same anticompetitive trend
exists. See id.
371 As Commissioner Susan Ness stated in separate statement to the FCC's order denying BellSouth's § 271 application, "I agree ... that the American consumer wil benefit
from intensified competition in the long distance market, and I look forward to the day
when I can cast my vote to approve a Section 271 application." BellSouth Corp., 13
F.C.C.1. 539, 678 (BellSouth SC Order) (separate statement of Commissioner Susan Ness).
372 SNET is allowed to provide both local and long-distance services. See supra note
329 and accompanying text.
373 See BellSouth Gilbert Affidavit, supra note 297, at 27-28 (noting that SNET's encroachment on AT&T's market share spawned a price war in which one competitor tried to
outdo the other by offering more attractive rates). Gilbert also estimates that the benefits
provided by SNET's entry approach $127 million per year. See id. at 29.
374 See Ameritech Michigan Application, supra note 91, at 72-73 (noting that new "entry into long distance will bring the benefits of increased efficiency to groups of consumers
that are not the principal targets of the long distance carriers").
375 See Ameritech MacAvoy Affidavit, supra note 357, at 33 ("These new entrants
[(BOCs)] will struggle for share of market revenues by attracting customers from the incumbent long-distance carriers[, which] could bring about entirely new competitive interactions among incumbents that effectively reduce prices.").
376 See BellSouth Woroch Affidavit, supra note 213, at 7 (recognizing that the longdistance carriers have substantial incentives to refrain from establishing significant local-
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hand, the opportunity to tap into the $110 billion local service market 3 7 7 creates a substantial incentive for the long-distance carriers to
move rapidly into the local markets. Given the tremendous uncertainties and risks involved, however, the long-distance carriers' most rational strategy may in fact call for a slow, careful procession into the
local markets. The threat that a vertically integrated BOC would pose
could persuade the current long-distance providers to move rapidly
into the local markets.3 78 On the other hand, by delaying their incursion into BOCs' territories, the major long-distance carriers aggressively can protect their own markets by vehemently maintaining their
first-things-first argument and opposing BOCs' entry through the
37 9
§ 271 process.
Although this defensive strategy may be in the long-distance carriers' best interests, it does not necessarily benefit consumers. Under a
more lenient review of § 271 applications, the FCC could increase the
incentives for long-distance carriers to enter local service markets
more hastily.38 0 Just as BOCs' entry into the long-distance market will
have marked benefits, so too will the entry of competitors into the
local telephony markets. The FCC Commissioners thus far have rejected this logic. 3 81 If the FCC maintains its stance, it will lose yet another opportunity to ignite fierce local competition and further
3 82
loosen the BOCs' grip on the local markets.
exchange facilities); see also SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at iii ("[Llarge
incumbent [long-distance] carriers might put off plans to provide facilities-based local
competition... if they thought this would keep Bell companies out of long distance.").
377 See Pressman, supra note 10.
378 Cf Chen, supra note 22, at 872 ("[T]he story of telecommunications reform-from
empire-building to divestiture to a hopeful future of open networks-suggests that the
threat of entry acts as a greater spur to invention than does monopoly.").
379 See BellSouth SC Application, supra note 91, at 67 ("The SCPSC found that '[t]he
entities with the financial and marketing resources to provide effective [local] competition
are the same [long-distance carriers] that have a direct financial interest in delaying [BellSouth's] competing in their long distance market.'" (quoting BellSouth Telecomm., Inc.,
Order No. 97-640, No. 97-101-C, at 66 (Pub. Serv. Comm'n s.C. July 31, 1997) (first, second, and fourth alterations in original)); see also FCC Should Keep FirstThings Firstin Louisiana, Says MCI, supra note 344 (claiming that the local markets are not yet open in
Louisiana and, therefore, BellSouth's application was premature).
380 See BellSouth Hausman Affidavit, supra note 285, at 3 ("BOC entry into long distance creates incentives for faster local entry, especially by [long-distance carriers].").
381 See KennardDismissesIdea of Bells'InterLATA Entry as Spurfor Local Competition, TELcO
CoMPrrrnoN REP., Dec. 18, 1997 ("FCC Chairman William E. Kennard last week rejected
the theory that letting Bell companies offer in-region interLATA services would spur interexchange carriers to move into local exchange markets." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
382

Cf DUESERBERG & GORDON, supra note 3, at 83 (noting the effect of current poli-

cies on competition). Duesterberg and Gordon elaborate:
A reluctance to let go of the traditional approach to regulation out of fear
that customers or the competitive process itself will be injured is understandable in light of the historical mission of regulation, but it is not consis-
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In addition to decreased prices, intense competition can lead to
tremendous technological innovation.3 8 3 As Thomas Duesterberg
and Kenneth Gordon note, "[a] serious problem is that regulation
38 4
can and does sometimes delay introduction of new technologies."
One cannot overstate the significance of delay in an industry so dependent on continued technological improvement. Businesses and
residential consumers alike have come to expect and depend upon
continued improvements in their telecommunications services.38 5 For
example, the explosion of the Internet has spawned continued pleas
8 86
for increased bandwidth, which accelerates Internet travel.
Aside from advances in technology, competition promises to afford additional consumer products. One example is the popular practice of "bundling. 3 8 7 Bundling-or one-stop shopping-refers to the
ability of a carrier to provide a consumer with local, long-distance, and
other requested services, eliminating the need of dealing with separate entities for these telecommunications products.3 8 8 A 1997 survey
by J.D. Power and Associates found that sixty-five percent of households are likely to choose a single company for all of their telecommunications needs.3 8 9 Market surveys in other countries also show that
consumers will choose to bundle their services if they have the oppor-

tent with permitting new technologies and services to bring down prices
and displace existing monopolies.
Id.
See id.at 5.
384 Id. The authors allege that the "FCC's extreme caution" in its cellular licensing
procedures resulted in a cost of $85 billion to the economy. Id.
385
Cf id. at 11 ("[C]onstant improvement in the telecommunications sector is a key to
maintaining the worldwide leadership and associated high standard of living the U.S. now
enjoys.").
386 See, e.g., Hundt Subcomm. Statemen supra note 7, at 18 ("Local competition is particularly important now because our local networks need to evolve to adapt to the country's
growing data needs."). Commissioner Ness remarks: "It's been estimated that as of (June
1997], 51 million Americans were online, up 46 percent from June 1996. And that's predicted to grow to 135 million people-or half the nation's population-by 2001." Commissioner Susan Ness, From Hype to Reality in the Emerging Digital Age, Remarks Before
the Wall StreetJournal Technology Summit (Oct. 15, 1997), available in 1997 FCC LEXIS
5732, at *7-8 (citations omitted).
387
See, e.g., BellSouth Gilbert Affidavit, supra note 297, at 4-13 (discussing the longdistance carriers' plans to offer bundled services and quoting the various carriers which
speak to the tremendous perceived advantages of bundling).
388 See SBC Oklahoma Application, supra note 91, at 67-69 (describing the advantages
of bundling).
SeeJ.D. Power and Assocs., JD. Power and Associates Analysis Reveals: Long Distance
389
CarriersPrimefor Local and Long Distance Telephone Market Share, Feb. 27, 1997 (visited Jan.
15, 1999) <http://wvvw.jdpower.com/jdpower/releases/70227tel.html>.
383
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tunity. 390 And bundling surely will not be the only innovative product
increased competition will generate. 39 1
Professor Chen wrote that "[s]ubstantial doubt clouds the often
contradictory predictions of what tomorrow's telecommunications
markets will do in fact."392 Though this warning undoubtedly is true,
the broader point is that whatever benefits the market ends up valuing, they will arrive more quickly with competition than without it;
they also will outweigh any possible anticompetitive effects that BOCs'
premature entry might have on the long-distance market. 393 The FCC
can precipitate a net gain by adopting a less stringent approach to the
§ 271 process and by allowing BOCs' entry into the long-distance market soon.3 94 The FCC should seize opportunities to rely on market
forces as these arise.3 95 The sooner it takes advantage of these opportunities, the sooner new investment will take place, and the sooner
consumers will realize the benefits the 1996 Act promised.3 9 6
CONCLUSION

More competition? The Telecommunications Act of 1996 promised deregulation, more competition, and increased consumer welfare. To realize these ambitions, the 1996 Act removed the legal
barriers that previously ruled the industry. Congress anticipated that
390 See BellSouth Hausman Affidavit, supra note 285, at 4 ("[M]arket data from the UK
and Canada demonstrate that a significant proportion of consumers will choose the onestop shopping package if it is made available.").
391 See, e.g., BellSouth Gilbert Affidavit, supra note 297, at 4-5 (quoting a speech by
AT&T CEO Robert Allen in which he said, "we'll differentiate ourselves not on price, but
on service features, applications and value that enrich people's lives and make businesses
more successful" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
392 Chen, supra note 294, at 543.
393 See BellSouth Hausman Affidavit, supra note 285, at 7-8 (concluding that the marginal benefits of allowing BOC entry outweigh the marginal costs of continued regulation);
Chen, supranote 22, at 871 ("The potential gains in consumer welfare outweigh whatever
anticompetitive consequences might flow from premature [BOG] entry into this market.").
394 See BellSouth Hausman Affidavit, supra note 285, at 19-21. Hausman uses an economic model to show the damaging effects of continued regulation, provided that BOGs
cannot charge supracompetitive prices in either the local or long distance markets. See id.
& n.27. He concludes by saying that "consumer welfare would be increased if BOG entry
were permitted because the consumer welfare gains from increased competition in long
distance will more than outweigh the incremental gain from the last step to regulatory
perfection that the Commission's Ameritech decision demands." Id, at 21.
395
Cf id. at 7 ("If all significant barriers ... to local entry have been removed, the
Commission should permit BOG entry into long distance markets.").
396

See DUESTERBERG & GORDON, supranote 3, at 23. Duesterberg and Gordon advise:
Moving immediately to reliance on market forces, rather than on traditional regulatory direction, is necessary if a truly efficient interconnected
network is to evolve, new investment is to take place at the proper rate (and
by those best able to do it), and customers are to receive the full benefits of
the dynamic new technologies.
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the industry heavyweights would invade each others' turf, bringing
about a deluge of consumer benefits. The reality after two years of
FCC administration of the 1996 Act, unfortunately, has tempered the
excitement. Two years of experience also have led to a fundamental
questioning of the FCC's proper role within the new statutory
3 97
regime.
Evidence of the FCC's failure to accept the change readily can be
seen in the § 271 application process. The FCC's review of these applications evidences a decidedly detail-oriented approach. So stringent is this approach that commentators and courts alike have
questioned whether any BOC feasibly can meet the FCC's § 271 requirements. The FCC has told us to wait. It has told us to be patient.
It has told us that it is tired of hearing how long the process is taking.
These admonitions are nonsense. We have had enough waiting and
patience-over three years at this point-but not nearly enough regulatory forbearance. The FCC must change course. Competition must
be allowed to flourish.

397 See id. at 3 ("Have regulators failed to be aggressive enough in implementing the
act, or have they attempted to undermine its intent?").

